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Note
“Wreaking Extraordinary Destruction”:
Defendant’s Irreplaceability as Presumptively
Reasonable Grounds for Downward Departure in
Sentencing
Jackie Fielding
INTRODUCTION
Senator Kamala Harris: “Your agency will be separating children from
their parents and—”
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen: “No.
What we’ll be doing is prosecuting parents who have broken the law,
just as we do every day in the United States of America.”
Harris: “They will be separated?”
Nielsen: “Just as they [are] in the United States every day.”1

In the summer of 2018, people across the United States were
enraged at the Trump Administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy
for illegally crossing the southern border,2 which entailed sepa-

 University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. Candidate 2020. I would like
to thank Professor Perry Moriearty for helping me to develop this topic, offering
guidance during the writing process, and her continued encouragement and
support. I am also grateful to the staff and editors of Minnesota Law Review for
their hard work. A special thank you to my family, especially my parents Kris
and Randy Fielding, for their endless love and support throughout my academic
and legal career. Copyright © 2020 by Jackie Fielding.
1. Authorities and Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the United
States: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. 19 (2018) (statement of Kirstjen Nielsen).
2. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, ATTORNEY GENERAL ANNOUNCES ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY FOR CRIMINAL ILLEGAL ENTRY
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero
-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/EUK3-T2X8]; Q&A:
Trump Administration’s “Zero-Tolerance” Immigration Policy, HUM. R. WATCH
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/16/qa-trump
-administrations-zero-tolerance-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/8XFG
-MY2M]. The zero-tolerance policy was seemingly intended as a deterrence tactic; one news article noted that a Trump administration official said, “Trump is
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rating children from their parents when families crossed together.3 Child advocates decried the policy, arguing that isolating migrant children from their parents could “cause irreparable
harm, disrupting a child’s brain architecture and affecting his or
her short- and long-term health,”4 and fearing the “serious, negative consequences to children’s health and development” and
the “psychological distress, anxiety, and depression associated
with separation from a parent.”5 The news coverage of this controversial practice ultimately culminated in the Trump Administration rescinding the policy through an executive order.6 Six
months after the announcement of the executive order, hundreds
of children remained separated from their parents;7 it soon be-

convinced that family separation has been the most effective policy at deterring
large numbers of asylum-seekers.” Julia Ainsley & Geoff Bennett, Trump’s Support of Renewed Child Separation Policy Led to Collision with Nielsen, NBC
NEWS (April 8, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump
-has-months-been-urging-administration-reinstate-child-separation-policy
-n992021 [https://perma.cc/NMR9-8WE8].
3. See Leslie Shapiro & Manas Sharma, How Many Migrant Children Are
Still Separated from Their Families?, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/tracking-migrant-family
-separation/?utm_term=.c1c51c8c3100 [https://perma.cc/WH4S-FYX8]; Sarah
Stillman, America’s Other Family-Separation Crisis, NEW YORKER (Nov. 5,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/11/05/americas-other-family
-separation-crisis [https://perma.cc/P58J-LLXL].
4. Colleen Kraft, AAP Statement Opposing Separation of Children and
Parents at the Border, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS (May 8, 2018), https://www.aap
.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/StatementOpposing
SeparationofChildrenandParents.aspx [https://perma.cc/G2RR-EKNR].
5. Children’s Defense Fund et al., Renewed Appeal from Experts in Child
Welfare, Juvenile Justice and Child Development to Halt the Separation of Children from Parents at the Border, CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND (June 7, 2018),
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/child-welfare
-juvenile.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JAU-PXU7].
6. Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 25, 2018), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/06/25/2018-13696/affording
-congress-an-opportunity-to-address-family-separation [https://perma.cc/
3JAU-PXU7] (“It is also the policy of this Administration to maintain family
unity, including by detaining alien families together where appropriate and consistent with law and available resources.”).
7. Arelis R. Hernández, Nearly 250 Migrant Children Still Separated
From Parents, ACLU Report Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/nearly-250-migrant-children-still
-separated-from-parents-aclu-report-says/2018/10/18/d3fc2fd0-d222-11e8
-b2d2-f397227b43f0_story.html?utm_term=.a5311fabbd3b [https://perma.cc/
98PW-BWXN].
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came apparent that thousands more children than originally estimated were separated from their families, and alarmingly, the
government “has no way of tracking the children taken from
their parents.”8 Over a year after the executive order claimed to
end the family separation policy, 700 more families had been separated, often due to loopholes in the executive order.9
Family separation is not limited to immigrant populations.
An estimated 3.6% of all minor children in the United States are
currently separated from their parent(s) due to parental incarceration.10 Mass incarceration has been a growing issue in the
United States for decades,11 but a surge in the incarceration of
women over the last half century has led to a dramatic uptick in
the number of children deprived of their primary parents as a
result of incarceration.12 In 1970, over 70% of counties in the
8. Sarah Jones, Trump Administration: Reuniting Some Separated Migrant Families Might Be Too Hard, NEW YORK MAG. (Feb. 4, 2019), http://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/hhs-reuniting-separated-migrant-families
-hard.html [https://perma.cc/6GLT-FGE5].
9. Nina Bala & Arthur Rizer, Trump’s Family Separation Policy Never Really Ended. This Is Why., THINK (July 1, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/
think/opinion/trump-s-family-separation-policy-never-really-ended-why
-ncna1025376 [https://perma.cc/964Z-8M97].
10. DOUG HAMILTON ET AL., COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT
ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4 (PEW CHARITABLE TRS. 2010), https://www
.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/
collateralcosts1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7E2-D5TA] (“2.7 million children
have a parent behind bars—1 in every 28 children (3.6[%] has a parent incarcerated, up from 1 in 125 just 25 years ago. Two-thirds of these children’s parents were incarcerated for non-violent offenses.”). The most recent statistics
from the U.S. Department of Justice estimated that 2.3% of all children in the
United States had an incarcerated parent in 2007. LAURA E. GLAZE & LAURA
M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN 2 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UV6D-YJZ4]. This number only reflects the number of children with parents in state or federal prison, not jail. See id. at 1.
11. JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE NEW DYNAMICS OF MASS INCARCERATION 8 (2018), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
publications/the-new-dynamics-of-mass-incarceration-report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5XRT-27YB].
12. While the incarceration of men and fathers is an important issue as
well, several portions of this Note focus on the incarceration of primary caregiver parents, which more often than not means mothers. This Note speaks
about the special incarceration issues of women because, as a generalization,
women continue to be impactful in United States children’s lives. See Gretchen
Livingston & Kristen Bialik, 7 Facts About U.S. Moms, PEW RES. CTR. (May 10,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/10/facts-about-u-s
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United States did not hold women in their jails at all.13 In contrast, as of November 2018, there were approximately 219,000
women incarcerated in the United States;14 roughly 1.5 million
women are put in jail during a calendar year.15 Seventy-two percent of the women incarcerated in the United States have minor
children,16 and most of these incarcerated mothers were the primary caregivers of their children just prior to incarceration,17
leaving nearly 150,000 children currently separated from their
mothers.18
Just as immigrant children separated from their parents
undergo “extremely detrimental” trauma,19 so too do children
isolated from their parents when those parents are incarcerated.20 Parents suffer from the separation as well; statistics suggest that severing the relationship between a mother and her

-mothers/ [https://perma.cc/2457-V9Y5] (noting that in 2016, working mothers
spent an average of fourteen hours a week on childcare, while working fathers
spent just eight; and that about one in four U.S. mothers are single parents,
versus only 7% of U.S. fathers).
13. ELIZABETH SWAVOLA ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, OVERLOOKED 6
(2016), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/overlooked-women-and
-jails-report-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DW6-DG69].
14. Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
pie2018women.html [https://perma.cc/KVC7-XLMP].
15. HUM. R. WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, YOU MISS SO MUCH
WHEN YOU’RE GONE: THE LASTING HARM OF JAILING MOTHERS BEFORE TRIAL
IN OKLAHOMA 21 (2018), https://www.aclu.org/report/you-miss-so-much-when
-youre-gone [https://perma.cc/QU27-7JG8].
16. Wendy Sawyer, The Gender Divide: Tracking Women’s State Prison
Growth, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/women_overtime.html [https://perma.cc/NN44-Y2CH].
17. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 16.
18. Id. at 13 app. t.1. While the number of children left behind from the
incarceration of fathers is greater (1,559,200 children left behind from 744,200
incarcerated fathers in 2007), the impact on children from maternal incarceration (147,400 children left behind from 65,600 incarcerated mothers in 2007)
may be greater because mothers are more likely to be primary caregivers for the
children; the most common caregiver of an incarcerated father’s child is the
other parent (generally, the mother). Id. at 13, 16.
19. Hurley Riley, The Impact of Parent-Child Separation at the Border, U.
MICH. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Sept. 7, 2018), https://sph.umich.edu/pursuit/
2018posts/family-separation-US-border.html [https://perma.cc/T5WS-Z7L4].
20. Stillman, supra note 3.
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child is linked to higher rates of recidivism and more parole violations.21 The sudden and unexpected need for a family member
or family friend to step into a parenting role can put a strain on
family and the community, especially grandparents of children
with incarcerated parents.22 Everyone is obligated to follow the
law, and there should be an investigation and accountability
when laws are broken. But the harms that accrue on the incarcerated parent’s child are harsh, long-lasting, and undeserving;23 careful consideration should be undertaken before a child
needlessly undergoes psychological trauma, economic insecurity,
and a risk of severance of their parents’ rights.24 An adult who
has been convicted of a crime should be the one subjected to any
resulting punishment, not the child of that adult.25
For defendants with dependents who rely on them, incarceration creates a multi-dimensional harm when these defendants
are unable to continue caring for their families. Some federal
courts have noted the value of assigning defendants a lower sentence than ordinarily would be imposed “when a term of imprisonment may ‘wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents
who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing.’”26 While
21. STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILINCARCERATED PARENTS 4 (2009), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/
cyf/childrenofincarceratedparents.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDZ3-G84R].
22. Jillian J. Turanovic et al., The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration
Revisited: A Qualitative Analysis of the Effects on Caregivers of Children of Incarcerated Parents, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 913, 918 (2012).
23. See infra Part I.B.1.
24. See infra Parts I.A.3, I.B.1.
25. See Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO.
L. REV. 793, 843–59 (2011) (discussing that the criminal justice system is premised on punishing autonomous, rational adults, not children).
26. United States v. Kon, No. 04 CR, 271-03 (RWS), 2006 WL 3208555, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129
(2d Cir. 1992)). The court went on to note three Second Circuit cases where a
departure was upheld for defendants who provided support for their families.
Id. Several other courts have used the “wreaking destruction” or “wreaking
havoc” language to convey the seriousness of the harm of parental incarceration
on dependents. See, e.g., Johnson, 964 F.2d at 129 (“The rationale for a downward departure here is not that Johnson’s family circumstances decrease her
culpability, but that we are reluctant to wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing.”); United States
v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945–46 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (“The court possesses
the discretion to avoid wreaking extraordinary destruction on dependents who
rely on the defendant for their care.”); United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp.
2d 89, 98–99 (D. Mass. 2002) (“I depart only in recognition of my unwillingness
to wreak havoc on the life of the dying [defendant’s wife,] Ms. LaCarubba.”).
DREN OF
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many courts focus on the “extraordinary” nature of the defendant’s support for their dependents when considering a lower sentence for a defendant, a few courts have instead used an “irreplaceability” test to determine if a defendant’s support for their
dependents is so irreplaceable that it necessitates a downward
departure in sentencing.27 This “irreplaceability” test better addresses the needs of dependents; merely analyzing the uniqueness or “extraordinariness” of the situation does not consider the
value of the defendant’s support for their dependents.
This Note provides an overview of the scope and harms of
parental incarceration, the United States federal sentencing regime, and how a defendant’s caregiving and financial support
factors into (or fails to be factored into) their sentence. Part I
provides background information on the increasing number of
incarcerated parents in the United States, the rippling effects of
parental incarceration, and the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines and federal sentencing law. Next, Part II.A explores how federal sentencing considers a defendant’s family ties
and responsibilities, under both the Guidelines and after the
Guidelines became non-mandatory. Part II.B explores United
States v. Huerta and United States v. Kon, two cases that utilize
an “irreplaceability” test in determining if the defendant’s absence will affect his or her dependents to a degree that the court
should take these collateral consequences into account at sentencing. Finally, Part III considers solutions to mitigate the
harm of parental incarceration. Part III.A reviews previous
scholarship suggesting legislative and policy suggestions. Part
III.B advocates for the Huerta and Kon test to be more widely
utilized in the federal courts. Part III.C addresses counterarguments. The incarceration of parents is a pervasive issue and its
effects are long-ranging; advocates, policy makers, judges, and
legislators should use all available tools to lessen the harmful
effects of incarceration on defendants’ families.
I. PARENTAL INCARCERATION: A CRACK IN THE
FAMILY FOUNDATION
Since the beginning of time, the family has been the foundational unit of societal organization.28 Ancient societies organized

27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See Douglas J. Brewer & Emily Teeter, Ancient Egyptian Society and
Family Life, FATHOM ARCHIVE (2004), http://fathom.lib.uchicago.edu/2/
21701778/ [https://perma.cc/WCE6-5KYT].
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themselves into nuclear families,29 and the Supreme Court has
recognized the fundamental rights to marry30 and parent.31
However, the drastic rise of incarceration in the last century
(and particularly the rise in women’s incarceration) has had turbulent, yet often unexamined, impacts on the family. Section A
discusses the scope of parental incarceration, detailing the increase in incarcerated mothers over the last several decades and
what happens to their children. Section B discusses the many
repercussions of parental incarceration, including harms to children, parents, and community members. Section C provides
background on United States federal sentencing law.
A. THE PREVALENCE OF FAMILY SEPARATION DUE TO PARENTAL
INCARCERATION
Family separation is a pervasive issue, and has been for decades. But the recent increase in the incarceration of women has
led to more children with primary caretakers behind bars.32
When these children have their primary caretaker arrested or
incarcerated, their lives can be turned upside down.33 The larger
the pool of incarcerated parents becomes, the more the ripple effects of their incarceration reverberate throughout their families
and communities.
1. Mass Incarceration in the United States
The United States is well-known as the top incarcerating
nation worldwide.34 After several decades of a “historically un-

29. Id.
30. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987).
31. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see discussion infra Part
I.B.2.
32. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part I.A.3.
34. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014), http://nap
.edu/18613. This dramatic growth of incarceration includes both state and federal prisons. Other organizations offer similar statistics. See Wendy Sawyer &
Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html
[https://perma.cc/GA2C-KTYK] (“The American criminal justice system holds
almost 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 109 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163 local jails, and 80 Indian Country jails as well
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precedented and internationally unique” increase in incarceration rates,35 statistics suggest that there are over 2.1 million incarcerated individuals in the United States.36 The rapid increase
in incarceration rates from 1973 (approximately 200,000 people
incarcerated) to 2009 (1.5 million people incarcerated)37 was perhaps somewhat spurred by increasing crime rates,38 but the dramatic increase in incarceration was likely caused by policy
choices that “significantly increased sentence lengths, required
prison time for minor offenses, and intensified punishment for
drug crimes.”39 The slew of policy decisions that resulted in decades of greater and greater incarceration rates did not drastically decrease the rate of crime;40 however, and consequentially,
it is estimated that nearly 40% of United States state and federal
prisoners (roughly 576,000 people) “are incarcerated with little
public safety rational”; that is, incarcerating these people does
not make the public any safer.41
The rapid increase in prison populations has led to overcrowding, underqualified staff, and limited services and programming options for prisoners.42 Inmates can have a variety of
as in military prisons, immigration detention facilities, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories.”).
35. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 2.
36. Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_
region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/47QB-79TG] (noting that the
United States has the highest number of incarcerated individuals in the world
at 2,121,600 people, as of January 13, 2020).
37. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 2. This is a 750% increase
in the population of incarcerated people.
38. Id. at 2–3. The homicide rates in the United States increased dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in 1980 (10.2 homicides per 100,000
United States residents). ALEXA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 2
(2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3AFC-EPQ6]. After peaking again in 1991 (9.8 homicides per 100,000 United
States residents), the homicide rate has decreased or remained steady ever
since. Id.
39. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 4; see also JAMES AUSTIN
& LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW MANY AMERICANS
ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 3–4 (2016), https://www.brennancenter
.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Unnecessarily_Incarcerated_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U58Y-HYTJ].
40. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 3.
41. AUSTIN & EISEN, supra note 39, at 7.
42. See CRAIG HANEY, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF INCARCERATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-PRISON ADJUSTMENT 2–3 (2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/
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psychological reactions to incarceration, which may include hypervigilance, “psychological distancing,” social withdrawal, or
“post-traumatic stress reactions to the pains of imprisonment.”43
If someone already struggles with mental illness (as many prison
inmates do44), prison conditions can lead to intense psychological
stress.45 In addition to these psychological harms, when a prisoner is released, collateral consequences form regulatory and legal limitations on a formerly incarcerated person’s access to occupational licensing, employment, housing, education, voting,
and other benefits, rights, and opportunities.46 On top of these
personal harms, parents must bear the burden of bringing economic strain, instability, and mental health issues upon their
families.47
2. The Surge of Incarceration of Primary Caregivers
According to recent estimates, 2.7 million children have an
incarcerated parent.48 Studies suggest that almost 7% of United
States children have lived with a parent who has been incarcerated at some point in the child’s life.49 As of 2007, parents repre-

basic-report/psychological-impact-incarceration-implications-post-prison
-adjustment [https://perma.cc/DTP7-WU4P].
43. Id. at 4–12 (“[B]ecause many prisons are clearly dangerous places from
which there is no exit or escape, prisoners learn quickly to become hypervigilant
and ever-alert for signs of threat or personal risk. . . . The alienation and social
distancing from others is a defense not only against exploitation but also against
the realization that the lack of interpersonal control in the immediate prison
environment makes emotional investments in relationships risky and unpredictable. . . . For some prisoners, incarceration is so stark and psychologically
painful that it represents a form of traumatic stress severe enough to produce
post-traumatic stress reactions once released.”).
44. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 7 tbl.12 (noting that 56.5% of
all parents in state prison have a mental health problem, with a much higher
percentage (72.8%) for mothers in state prison who lived with their minor children prior to incarceration).
45. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 6.
46. About, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION,
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/VT83-GG5G].
47. See infra Part I.B.2.
48. This adds up to about one in every twenty-eight children. Doug Hamilton et al., supra note 10, at 4. The latest statistics from the United States Department of Justice state that over 1.7 million minor children in the United
States had a parent in prison in 2007. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at
1.
49. This amounts to over five million kids. DAVID MURPHEY & P. MAE
COOPER, PARENTS BEHIND BARS: WHAT HAPPENS TO THEIR CHILDREN? 3
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sented more than half of the 1.5 million state and federal prisoners in the United States.50 Over the preceding sixteen years, the
percentage of parents in state and federal prison grew by 79%,51
with a corresponding increase in children with an incarcerated
parent at 80%.52 The percentage of mothers in state and federal
prisons increased by 122%,53 and the increase in children of incarcerated mothers was over 130%.54
The incarceration of women, especially at the state and local
level, has grown faster than the rate for men since the 1970s;
women are now the fastest-growing population of incarcerated
people in the United States.55 The majority of incarcerated
women in the United States have minor children (over 60% of
women in prison and almost 80% of women in jails),56 and 5% of
women housed in jails are pregnant.57 In less than two decades,
the number of children with a mother in prison has increased
131%.58
The majority of incarcerated women are imprisoned for nonviolent offenses.59 While some have noted that initial analysis of
comparative data may suggest that women are given lighter sentences than men, one study demonstrated that “direct comparison of similar sounding crimes often reveals that the woman is
(2015), https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015
-42ParentsBehindBars.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JGW-PSM4].
50. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 1 (estimating that 809,800 of
the total 1,518,535 prisoners in the United States (approximately 53%) were
parents as of 2007).
51. Id. at 1. This rate was lower than the overall increase in state and federal prison populations during the same time period (92% increase from 1991 to
2007). Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 13 app. tbl.1.
54. Id.
55. Sawyer, supra note 16.
56. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 15,
at 3.
57. Id. at 29.
58. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 2.
59. Kajstura, supra note 14. Percentages of nonviolent female offenders in
local jails, state prisons, and federal prisons are 86%, 63%, and 95%, respectively. Id. One report declared, “the vast majority of offenses committed by
women are relatively minor and non-violent.” ROSS PARKE & K. ALISON
CLARKE-STEWART, EFFECTS OF PARENTAL INCARCERATION ON YOUNG CHILDREN 12 (2002), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/60691/
410627-Effects-of-Parental-Incarceration-on-Young-Children.PDF [https://
perma.cc/M3T7-6NQL].
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less blameworthy than her male counterpart” when the offense,
offender’s prior record, the relationship between the offender
and the crime victim, and how the crime was carried out are
taken into consideration.60 When women commit drug crimes,
they commonly are low-level actors, serving as mules or assisting male intimate partners in drug conspiracies.61 Considering
how common it is for incarcerated women to be mothers, and to
be the primary caregivers of their minor children, coupled with
the proportion of total inmates who are unnecessarily incarcerated, and the amount of female offenders who have committed
non-violent offenses, it appears that incarcerated mothers are
paying a devastating price for a perceived public safety goal that
isn’t being effectuated.
These incarcerated mothers are often women of color.62 For
parents incarcerated at the state level, mothers were more likely
than fathers to report past physical or sexual abuse (four times
more likely), homelessness (twice as likely), and medical and
mental health problems (one and a half times more likely).63 The
majority of mothers in state and federal prisons had experienced

60. Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight of
Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133,
135 (1999).
61. Id. A drug mule is “a drug courier who is paid, coerced or tricked into
transporting drugs across an international border but who has no further commercial interest in the drugs.” EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS &
DRUG ADDICTION, A DEFINITION OF “DRUG MULES” FOR USE IN A EUROPEAN
CONTEXT 3 (2012), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/692/
EMCDDA_ThematicPapers_DrugMules_329088.pdf [https://perma.cc./GWX4
-4AFM]. The practice of taking advantage of economically disadvantaged
women to use them in drug rings is an international issue:
Almost without exception these [Latin American] women represent the
lowest rung of labor in the drug trade. . . . Others become involved in
the trade through their emotional ties to men—whether lovers, brothers, or fathers. . . . [Trafficking] is destroying many families, not just
the people who consume but also those of us who are in prison because
of someone stronger than us, someone who simply used and abused us.
Corina Giacomello, How the Drug Trade Criminalizes Women Disproportionately, N. AM. CONGRESS ON LATIN AM. (June 17, 2014), https://nacla.org/article/
how-drug-trade-criminalizes-women-disproportionately [https://perma.cc/
5CAV-PPNH].
62. Approximately 50% of state inmates who are mothers are White, about
27% are Black, and 15% are Hispanic. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at
13 app. tbl.2. For federal inmates who are mothers, approximately 36% are
White, 29% are Black, and 31% are Hispanic. Id.
63. Id. at 7.
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physical or sexual abuse, mental health problems, and substance
dependence or abuse.64
The disparities apply to the children of the incarcerated, too.
More children of color have parents in prison than White children;65 reports suggest that Black children are nearly twice as
likely to have an incarcerated parent as White children.66 In addition, rural children, poor children, and children with parents
that have limited education are disproportionately affected by
parental incarceration.67 While nearly half of the children of incarcerated mothers in state prisons are nine years old or
younger, it is estimated that over one-third of all children will
turn eighteen during the course of their parent’s incarceration.68
3. What Happens to Children When Their Primary Caregiver
Is Incarcerated: The Process
A parent’s arrest can significantly impact a child, even if the
child did not witness the arrest firsthand.69 The child “may feel
shock, immense fear, anxiety, or anger towards the arresting officers or law enforcement in general. . . . [S]uch events can and
often do have a negative impact on a child’s immediate and longterm emotional, mental, social, and physical health.”70 In addition, this traumatic experience can lead to a higher likelihood
that the child will have problems with law enforcement or commit criminal acts in the future.71
Upon a parent’s arrest, their child (or children) may be left
with the other parent, a relative of the child, or a caregiver designated by the parent.72 Otherwise, law enforcement is supposed

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 19 app. tbl.12.
Id. at 2.
MURPHEY & COOPER, supra note 49, at 4.
Id.
GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 3.
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS 1
(2014), https://www.bja.gov/publications/iacp-safeguardingchildren.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6B5K-BRGD].
70. Id.
71. See id. at 1–2.
72. Different voices have different views on how much weight to give caregiver designation by the parent. A U.S. Department of Justice report notes that:
Parents have the right to express their preference in where they would
like their child to be housed and the person(s) who should provide care
and supervision. If the arrested parent has sole custody of the child, he
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to arrange for the child to go into the child welfare system.73 Unfortunately, researchers have noted that many children are “left
to fend for themselves in empty apartments for weeks or even
months in the wake of a parent’s arrest.”74 Fortunately, this issue has caught the attention of the federal government in recent
years, and police-created model policy statements identify the
importance of considering the possibility of children’s involvement before pursuing an arrest,75 minimizing trauma to children, and “support[ing] a child’s physical safety and well-being
following an arrest.”76
or she should be given a reasonable opportunity to select a caregiver
unless the arrest is for child abuse or neglect, . . .
but officers should confirm that designated caregivers have the ability to be appropriate placements for the children. Id. at 15–16. Other reports note that the
child’s placement may be largely dictated by an officer’s judgment call; a California research publication states, “[n]early two-thirds of the responding agencies report that they will accept an arrestee’s suggested caretaker, at the discretion of the arresting officer. . . . An officer’s response is conditioned by limited
resources, and depends on the ability of the officer to make a judgment call in
the field.” MARCUS NIETO, IN DANGER OF FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: CHILDREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS 13 (2002), http://www.library.ca.gov/Content/
pdf/crb/reports/02-009.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ37-94TT]. In the case of an arrested mother, it is much more likely in practice that a police officer or sheriff
(46% likelihood), or a child protective services worker (46%) will decide if the
parent’s designated caretaker is suitable than the arrested mother herself (6%
likelihood). Id. at 14 chart 4; id. at p. 54.
73. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 69, at 15–16; LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, INCARCERATED PARENTS MANUAL: YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (Carol
Strickman et al. eds., 2010), https://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/Incarcerated-Parents-Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/74TL
-KWY7]. “Child welfare” is defined as “a continuum of services designed to ensure that children are safe and that families have the necessary support to care
for their children successfully.” CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., WHAT IS CHILD WELFARE? A GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS 1 (2018),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cw_educators.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8Z97-KK93]. Child welfare agencies often have mechanisms for reporting and
addressing child abuse and neglect, arranging for children in unsafe homes to
live with other family members or foster families, and handling reunification
and adoption. Id.
74. GINNY PUDDEFOOT & LISA K. FOSTER, KEEPING CHILDREN SAFE WHEN
THEIR PARENTS ARE ARRESTED: LOCAL APPROACHES THAT WORK 9 (2007),
https://www.pdx.edu/ccf/sites/www.pdx.edu.ccf/files/CAprojectKeepingChildren
SafeWhenParentsAreArrested.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8RE-VFRY].
75. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note
69, at 12.
76. Id. at 8 (“The overriding policy statement of the Model Policy that
guides this discussion paper states that: It is the policy of this department that
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As noted, upon a caregiver’s arrest, if neither a parent, relative, or designated caregiver are willing and fit to take the
child, then the child goes to a foster care placement.77 Foster care
is a temporary caregiving situation (with care given by the
child’s relatives, unrelated foster parents, or in a residential
placement) provided by the state for parents who cannot care for
their children.78 Foster care may mean instability in a child’s
placement, and difficulty in maintaining connections to siblings,
extended family, friends, school, and their community.79
The latest statistics suggest that there are nearly 443,000
children in foster care in the United States every year,80 with
approximately 7% (over 20,000 children) in the system due to
parental incarceration.81 Approximately 3% of parents incarcerated in state prisons have children in foster care,82 but the gender of the incarcerated parent changes the statistic; for stateincarcerated mothers, children are five times more likely than
children of state-incarcerated fathers to be put in foster care.83
While all parental incarceration can carry a risk of disruption in children’s lives, there are special repercussions that accompany the recent increase in the incarceration of mothers.
Around 80% of mothers in federal and state prisons were the primary caregivers of their children prior to incarceration (as op-

officers will be trained to identify and respond effectively to a child, present or
not present, whose parent is arrested in order to help minimize potential trauma
and support a child’s physical safety and well-being following an arrest.”).
77. Id. at 15–16; LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, supra note
73, at 2. It should be noted that relatives may also serve as foster parents.
78. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Foster Care,
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/
outofhome/foster-care/ [https://perma.cc/4MKZ-WK4Y].
79. CHRISTIAN, supra note 21, at 3.
80. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE
AFCARS REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/resource/afcars-report
-25 [https://perma.cc/ZH6F-D4QE].
81. Id. at 2.
82. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 5.
83. Id. at 5 (noting that the percentage of state prison-incarcerated fathers
who have children cared for in a foster home or agency is 2.2%, whereas the
number for mothers is 10.9%).
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posed to around 30% of federally- and state-incarcerated fathers).84 For most fathers who are incarcerated in state prisons,
their children are very likely to be cared for by another parent
when they become incarcerated (88%), but this is much less
likely for incarcerated mothers (37%).85 Mothers were more
likely to be in single-parent households prior to incarceration,
leaving no second parent to care for a child when the mother is
imprisoned.86 When a father is incarcerated, the child usually is
cared for by their mother; when a mother is incarcerated, the
inverse is not nearly as common.
The problem of parental incarceration is expansive, and affects numerous children throughout the United States. These
children often suffer through challenging processes, suffer disruptions in their lives and daily routines, and this disruption can
impact their development.
B. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF PARENTAL INCARCERATION: THE
IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY
Parental incarceration can harm everyone who is impacted
by it. The children left behind must scramble to adjust to a life
with one less caregiver and financial supporter, in addition to
dealing with the stigma of having an incarcerated parent.87 The
incarcerated parent must live with the guilt of those they have
left behind, in addition to the typical challenges that come along
with incarceration.88 In addition, community members may suffer from a lost neighbor, friend, or supporter.89
1. The Harms to Children
Parental incarceration has a strong correlation with economic strain in children’s households, an increased risk of instability in the child’s living situation, and a higher likelihood of
84. Around 77% of mothers in state prisons and over 80% of mothers in
federal prison were the primary caregivers of their children prior to incarceration; 26% of state-incarcerated fathers and 31% of federally-incarcerated fathers
were the primary caregivers of their children prior to incarceration. Id. at 16.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 4 (noting that of the state prison-incarcerated parents who lived
with their minor children prior to arrest or incarceration, 17.2% of fathers reported living in a single-parent home, whereas 41.7% of mothers reported living
in a single-parent home).
87. See infra Part I.B.1.
88. See infra Part I.B.2.
89. See infra Part I.B.3.
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interaction with the child welfare system.90 Moving homes, having a non-relative parental figure, divorce, and switching schools
can threaten a child’s healthy development.91 Research has
linked parental incarceration with health, behavioral, and educational problems; mental and physical health issues can follow
these children into their adulthood.92 Parental incarceration is
associated with other Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs),93
which are “exposures that are associated with increased risk for
trauma, or toxic stress, particularly when they are cumulative,”
such as living with someone struggling with substance abuse or
mental illness, parental divorce, or witnessing domestic violence.94 Among children who have had a parent incarcerated,
over one-third have been a witness to violence between their parents or guardians.95 The disruption in the child/parent relationship, long-lasting stress, and replacement care (that may be inadequate) can weigh heavily on children, and disrupt their
healthy development.96 As a result, children may turn to harmful and destructive behaviors, such as withdrawal, physical and
verbal aggression, hypervigilance, sexualized actions, fighting,
gang involvement, substance abuse, and antisocial characteristics.97 Further, the stigma of having an incarcerated parent itself
is harmful to children.98 These psychological, physical, financial,
and educational hurdles can last even after a child’s parent has
ended their incarceration.99

90. CHRISTIAN, supra note 21, at 3.
91. Id. at 3.
92. MURPHEY & COOPER, supra note 49, at 1–2.
93. Id. at 4.
94. Id. at 4–5.
95. Id. at 4–5. This is in contrast to children without an incarcerated parent, among whom 10% had witnessed violence between their parents or guardians, or witnessed or experienced violence in their neighborhood. Id. at 5.
96. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS
6 (2006), https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/ccj/CCJ%20CIP%20FINAL%
20REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FKR-VG7K].
97. Id.
98. See generally, MURPHEY & COOPER, supra note 49 (explaining such
harms).
99. Amy B. Cyphert, Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change
for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 77 MD. L. REV. 385, 385 (2018) (discussing
the “detrimental consequences that can continue even long after a parent has
been released”).
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2. The Harms to Parents
The effects of incarceration on each incarcerated parent and
their family can be devastating. While one might think that the
overall increase in incarceration has caused an increase in children entering foster care, studies suggest the inverse—the removal of a child leads to an increase in criminal activity for their
mother.100 A mother’s responsibility for her child can serve as a
motivating factor, or a “brake on a parent’s destructive behavior . . . Once that brake is removed, destructive behavior accelerates.”101 In contrast, community-based sentencing programs
(where a mother is able to avoid incarceration altogether, and
can therefore spend time with her children) have demonstrated
lower rates of recidivism and better chances of family preservation.102
While much attention is paid to the harms on children separated by their parents, less is written about the harms mothers
suffer when they are separated from their children. Their experiences can mirror or be impacted by their child’s trauma, causing panic, anxiety, and depression.103 Mothers separated from
100. TIMOTHY ROSS ET AL., HARD DATA ON HARD TIMES: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION, FOSTER CARE, AND VISITATION, 9–10
(2004), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/vera/245_461.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L5W6-2VJU] (concluding that according to a study of New York mothers whose
children entered foster care in the fiscal year 1997, “[c]hild removal appears to
accelerate criminal activity among the study group’s mothers”).
101. Id. at 14; see also DIANA BRAZZELL, USING LOCAL DATA TO EXPLORE
THE EXPERIENCES AND NEEDS OF CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 4
(2008), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/31861/411698
-Using-Local-Data-to-Explore-the-Experiences-and-Needs-of-Children-of
-Incarcerated-Parents.PDF [https://perma.cc/L5W6-2VJU] (noting that based
on research from Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, “the number of bookings increased steadily in the years before foster care placement, spiked in the year of
placement, and continued to rise in the years after placement”).
102. COMMONWEALTH OF PA. JOINT STATE GOV’T COMM’N., THE EFFECTS OF
PARENTAL INCARCERATION ON CHILDREN: NEEDS AND RESPONSIVE SERVICES,
H.R. 203, S. 52, at 24 (2011), https://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/resources/documents/
ftp/documents/children%20of%incarcerated%20parents.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C5NZ-PNMT] (“According to the survey of 24 community-based programs for
mother [sic] and children in 14 states, ‘community sentencing programs yielded
reduced recidivism and increased family preservation – outcomes that have positive implications for children’s adjustment.’”). Visitation alone can decrease recidivism rates for parents. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 387.
103. Kimberly Lawson, The Lasting Impact Family Separation Can Have on
Parents, VICE (July 12, 2018, 2:59 PM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/
j5nqzg/the-lasting-impact-family-separation-can-have-on-parents [https://
perma.cc/UVJ8-3GDK].
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their children may have suicidal thoughts, risk losing their will
to live, discontinue sleeping or eating, or fail to adequately take
care of themselves.104 The pain of incarceration as a parent extends further than the torment of living life behind bars.
Parents placed in jails or prisons are unable to continue caring for their children at home. Consequentially, they run the risk
that their children could be removed from their homes (if there
is not another, fit parent available to care for them), and eventually their parental rights may be terminated. Removal of a
child from their parent/guardian105 and termination of parental
rights106 are two separate legal processes (although they can certainly be related). Termination of parental rights can happen
voluntarily or involuntarily, and is a much longer process.107 An
incarcerated mother can lose her parental rights to her child if
her child is in the state’s care and the state files a petition for
termination of parental rights,108 if the other parent of the child
files for their new spouse to adopt the child, or if a family member cares for the child and requests adoption, proceedings
begin.109 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)110
adds further complications; it includes a provision that if a child
remains in (non-relative) foster care for fifteen of the last twentytwo months, then the state is required to file a petition for the
termination of parental rights and search for a suitable family
104. Id.
105. Child removal provisions vary by state. For example, in Minnesota, children may be removed from their parents for various reasons, such as abandonment; physical or sexual abuse (or witness thereof); emotional maltreatment;
lacking necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care; medical neglect; failure to thrive; prostitution; running away; or habitual truancy.
MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2018).
106. See Overview of Terminating Parental Rights, FAMILY LAW SELF-HELP
CTR. (2020), https://www.familylawselfhelpcenter.org/self-help/adoption
-termination-of-parental-rights/overview-of-termination-of-parental-rights
[https://perma.cc/ACN3-25BE] (explaining that termination of parental rights
means “the person’s rights as a parent are taken away. The person is not the
child’s legal parent anymore,” and listing seven reasons (abandonment, neglect,
fitness, risk of injury, token efforts, “Failure of Parental Adjustment,” and sexual assault) for termination).
107. See, e.g., § 260C.301.
108. Emily Halter, Parental Prisoners: The Incarcerated Mother’s Constitutional Right to Parent, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 539, 551–52 (2018).
109. Id. It should be noted that parental rights are not usually terminated
immediately upon incarceration. Id. at 551.
110. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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for the child’s adoption.111 The average length of an incarcerated
parent’s stay in state prison is estimated at seven years (and
nine years for federal prison), leaving many parents at risk of
their state child welfare agency filing termination proceedings.112 While incarceration alone is not a sufficient reason for
severance of parental rights,113 a parent’s inability to care for
their children during (and after) incarceration can contribute to
termination of parental rights proceedings.114 Termination of parental rights are ordinarily final; the parent loses their legal relationship with their child.115
3. The Harms to the Community
Not every incarceration harms the community from which
the incarcerated individual came; community members can benefit when their neighbors who committed crimes are incarcerated.116 Similarly, when one shares a home with someone who
111. Id. at § 103(a)(3). ASFA provides for several exceptions to the 15/22
months rule: termination petitions are not required (1) if a relative is caring for
the child, (2) if filing the petition would not be in the child’s best interests, or (3)
if the state has failed to provide the child’s family with adequate reunification
services. Id.
112. Philip M. Genty, The Inflexibility of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
and Its Unintended Impact upon the Children of Incarcerated Parents and Their
Families, 1 CHILD WELFARE 360° 10, 10 (2008), https://cascw.umn.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2013/12/CW360.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L2G-B458]; see also
GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 20 (noting that at the time of a 2004
survey, 62.5% of state prison-incarcerated mothers (and 78.9% of federal prisonincarcerated mothers) had served over twelve months already, and 38.2% of
state-incarcerated mothers (and 54.4% of federally-incarcerated mothers) had
at least twelve months remaining on their current sentence).
113. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their
child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”).
114. See Halter, supra note 108, at 551–53 (“Parental rights are generally
not terminated at the moment that someone is incarcerated. However, mothers
occasionally lose their parental rights during, and as a result of, incarceration . . . . Once a child ends up in the foster system, it is incredibly difficult to
get him or her out. . . . [O]nce parental rights are terminated, it is usually final.”).
115. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761 (“For the foster parents, the State’s
failure to prove permanent neglect may prolong the delay and uncertainty until
their foster child is freed for adoption. But for the natural parents, a finding of
permanent neglect can cut off forever their rights in their child.”).
116. Todd R. Clear et al., Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary Examination of Concentrated Incarceration and Social Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q.
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struggles with substance dependency or is criminally-involved,
it can be “enormously stressful and disruptive to healthy family
functioning.”117 While some family members may help with caring for children and contributing income, criminally-involved individuals may strain family resources and hinder positive parenting efforts.118 Still, the high number of incarcerated parents
with low-level and nonviolent119 offenses indicates that many of
these incarcerated parents may not be harmful if they stayed in
their homes.120
Caregivers undergo a major strain when adding another dependent to their lives and homes; suddenly becoming responsible
for a child can be “a major, unexpected role transition.”121 While
the most common caregiver for incarcerated fathers’ children is
the other parent, the top caregiver for incarcerated mothers’ children is a grandparent (and in particular, a grandmother).122
Caregivers face a variety of challenges, including the need to
change residences with children due to added economic burdens,
and difficulty maintaining their jobs.123 Grandparent caregivers
often have their limited physical, emotional, and financial resources strained in their new caregiving role, and may struggle
to manage their own needs (such as depression and chronic
33, 38 (2003) (noting that “[i]n a study of two high-incarceration neighborhoods,
Rose, Clear, and Ryder (2000) found that while residents benefited from the
incarceration of family members and neighbors who were committing crimes,
they suffered many losses as well”).
117. Turanovic et al., supra note 22, at 914, 920 (noting that “if [a] parent
was engaging in dangerous or reckless behaviors before imprisonment, then his
or her incarceration may allow for the remaining family system to function more
positively”).
118. Id. at 914.
119. PARKE & CLARKE-STEWART, supra note 59, at 12; Kajstura, supra note
14.
120. It is estimated that over half a million of incarcerated Americans do not
pose a risk to public safety. AUSTIN & EISEN, supra note 39, at 7.
121. Turanovic et al., supra note 22, at 918.
122. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that 88.4% of incarcerated fathers in state prison in 2004 had their minor children cared for by the
other parent, yet only 37% of incarcerated mothers could say the same. State
prison-incarcerated mothers were more likely to have a grandparent (44.9%),
usually a grandmother (42.1%), care for their children while incarcerated). Indeed, grandparents have played an important role in childrearing for centuries.
Robin McKie, Wisdom of Grandparents Helped Rise of Prehistoric Man, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2011, 7:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2011/jul/24/
prehistoric-man-helped-as-elderly-survived [https://perma.cc/JWZ2-H9X8].
123. Turanovic et al., supra note 22, at 917.
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health issues).124 Additional difficulties include guilt over their
ability to parent in the place of the missing biological parents,
the sensitive topic of petitioning for legal custody of children, and
handling particularly difficult children.125 The consequences of
parental incarceration extend beyond merely a parent and child,
seeping into extended family and community members’ lives.
C. UNITED STATES FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW
Federal sentencing law has several provisions relating to
the defendant’s caregiving and financial support to their dependents, and for determining whether there would be an adequate
replacement for those dependents in the defendant’s absence.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines set the bar fairly high, allowing for this to be taken into consideration at the sentencing stage
only if the circumstances are “extraordinary” (as in, outside the
ordinary consequences of a family member being incarcerated).
Since the advent of the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, judges have generally followed the standardized formula it provides for federal criminal sentencing. The Guidelines
were closely adhered to for decades, and their pervasive reach
continues, even after the Supreme Court declared that federal
judges have the discretion to sidestep the Guidelines.
1. The Genesis of the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and United States v. Booker
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 directed the United
States Sentencing Commission to create federal sentencing
guidelines in order to decrease sentencing disparities and promote proportionality and transparency in sentencing.126 By
1987, the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the
Guidelines” or “the Sentencing Guidelines”) were created,
providing federal judges with a uniform guide for determining

124. Id. at 918.
125. Id.
126. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, 1
(2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H98W-WRBK].
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sentencing outcomes.127 Judges were bound by the Guidelines,128
and were forced to work within their framework until the Supreme Court’s 2005 case United States v. Booker, which shifted
the Guidelines from being mandatory on judges to being merely
advisory.129
In United States v. Booker, defendant Freddie J. Booker was
found guilty of possession with intent to distribute at least fifty
grams of crack cocaine, based on evidence that Booker had 92.5
grams of crack cocaine in his bag.130 The Sentencing Guidelines
directed the judge to sentence Booker to between 210 and 262
months in prison,131 but at a post-trial sentencing proceeding,
the judge concluded that by a preponderance of the evidence
Booker was guilty of obstructing justice, and that he had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine.132 The obstruction charge and the additional possession mandated a sentence
between 360 months and life imprisonment.133 In the end, “instead of the sentence of 21 years and 10 months that the judge
could have imposed on the basis of the facts proved to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, Booker received a 30-year sentence”
(based on the obstruction and additional possession charges, determined by the judge using a preponderance of the evidence
standard, without a jury).134
The Sixth Amendment, however, gives each defendant protection “against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
127. Id. at 3.
128. The Operative U.S. Code provision states that:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence
of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless
the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration,
the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000).
129. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005) (holding that “two
provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) that have the effect of
making the Guidelines mandatory must be invalidated”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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which he is charged,”135 and defendants have “the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime
with which he is charged.”136 Therefore, the Supreme Court held
that when Booker’s judge made a determination that affected his
sentencing without the jury and with a lower standard of proof,
the decision violated the Sixth Amendment.137 Booker therefore
morphed the Sentencing Guidelines from requirements placed
on judges with limited discretion, to a system that is now “effectively advisory.”138
In the aftermath of Booker, courts use a three-step process
with the Guidelines. Courts are instructed to have respectful
consideration of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(1) in initially calculating the sentencing range;
(2) in considering policy statements or commentary in the Guidelines
Manual about departures from the guideline range; and
(3) in considering all of the § 3553(a) factors (which include the guidelines, commentary, and any relevant policy statements in the Guidelines Manual) in deciding what sentence to impose, whether within the
applicable range, or whether as a departure or as a variance (or as
both).139

Despite the discretion the Booker decision granted judges in
determining sentences, judges have largely continued to follow
the Sentencing Guidelines, possibly because a sentence within
the Guidelines is often viewed as presumptively “reasonable” on
appeal,140 and judges are concerned about having their decisions
overturned,141 or because they are comfortable and familiar with
135. Id. at 230 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, (1970)).
136. Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995)).
137. Id. at 235, 243–44.
138. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
139. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 126, at 12.
140. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 401 (“[After Booker,] [i]n Rita v. United
States, the Supreme Court [created the presumption] . . . that a sentence within
the Guidelines range was a reasonable sentence. . . . [T]he presumption creates
a powerful temptation for trial judges (who are understandably not eager to be
overturned) to sentence defendants within the Guidelines range.”). For an argument that not all Guidelines sentences are automatically “reasonable,” see
Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines
World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 711 (2006) (“[T]his does not provide an automatic pass for all Guidelines sentences because such an interpretation flies in
the face of making the Guidelines discretionary . . . . [T]he [§ 3553(a)] directive
to consider . . . the defendant’s characteristics . . . seems to render post-Booker
Guidelines sentences open to reasonableness challenges.”).
141. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 402–03.
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the Guidelines.142 Therefore, while judges are not required to follow the their ubiquity of its following necessitates a closer look.
2. Federal Sentencing Law and the Sentencing Process
Federal sentencing considers both “utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment.”143 The Sentencing Guidelines
provide that when a judge is considering a defendant’s sentence,
they should “consider the nature and seriousness of the conduct,
the statutory purposes of sentencing, and the pertinent offender
characteristics.”144 Then, “[t]he court should impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
statutory purposes of sentencing.”145 In the Criminal Sentencing
provision of the United States Code, judges are instructed to consider both the defendant’s offense and their personal history and
characteristics, and “the need for the sentence imposed” in terms
of proportionality, deterrence, and the most effective treatment.146 While both sources express a desire for retributivism,
they also mention taking into account a defendant’s personal history and characteristics, including the effect the defendant has
on others.147 The emphasis on calculating both a particular defendant’s culpability and the effect on public safety underlying
142. Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST.
117, 155–56 (2014) (suggesting several reasons for judges’ adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines, including past experience, cognitive anchoring, and the
seemingly “empirical approach” of the Guidelines).
143. Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe to Include Considerations of
the Effects on Families and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83
UMKC L. REV. 73, 75 (2014).
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, introductory cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
145. Similarly, the U.S. Code notes that: “[t]he court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes . . . of
this subsection.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). Those purposes note that
[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider—. . . (2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner.
Id.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2018).
147. See id.; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, ch. 5.

2020] WREAKING EXTRAORDINARY DESTRUCTION 2589
these instructions demonstrates overarching objectives of accountability, but also due consideration for the rippling effects
the defendant has on their community; retribution is not the singular goal of the United States federal sentencing regime.
Most federal sentencing proceeds in the following manner: a
defendant agrees to plead guilty (often in order to gain access to
the benefits of a prosecutor’s plea deal) and then the defendant
presents a “factual basis” to the court (admitting to the basic
components of the offense).148 The court tells the defendant the
range of potential punishment, based on the Sentencing Guidelines.149 To use the Sentencing Guidelines, judges identify the
crime committed, consider any relevant history (the criminal
record) of the defendant, and locate the box on a grid corresponding to the recommended range of months of imprisonment.150
Certain situations or characteristics of a defendant may cause
the judge to assign a sentence above or below the recommended
window. These aggravating or mitigating factors that affect sentencing outcomes are referred to as “departures” or “variances.”151
Under the Sentencing Guidelines Section 5H1.6, consideration of a defendant’s “family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be
warranted,”152 which has usually been interpreted to mean that
family ties may only cause an adjustment if the familial responsibilities are of an extraordinary nature.153 “Extraordinary” is

148. U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 126, at 5 (“Over 95% of federal
defendants convicted of a felony or Class A misdemeanor offense are adjudicated
guilty based on a guilty plea rather than on a verdict at a trial.”).
149. Id.
150. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 1B1.1.
151. Id. ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(b). A “departure” is a non-Guidelines sentence (that
is, a sentence not within the assigned Guidelines range for the offense) due to a
provision in Chapter Four (“Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood”) or
Chapter Five (“Determining the Sentence”) of the Sentencing Guidelines; similarly, a “variance” is a non-Guidelines sentence due to consideration of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at v;
United States v. Valenzuela-Perez, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277 (D.N.M. 2011).
152. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 5H1.6.
153. See United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (declaring that “the ‘extraordinary’ can be defined only in relation to the ‘ordinary’; and
at the risk of belaboring the obvious, we add that ordinary family responsibilities can be very great”). See discussion infra Part II.A.1 for further detail on
Section 5H1.6 Family Ties and Responsibilities departures.
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not clearly defined,154 and the interpretations have not been consistent.155 Although the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory for judges, in practice, some Circuits have continued to stick
with the “extraordinary” criteria, while others have been more
open-minded to considering family ties as a mitigating factor at
sentencing.156
After determining the Sentencing Guidelines range, the
court decides whether to implement the sentence bargained for
in the plea deal, or amend the sentence.157 The United States
Sentencing Commission recommends that the court wait until
after it has reviewed the presentence report before accepting the
plea deal.158 The presentence report, ordinarily created after the
guilty plea hearing, includes information taken during a presentence interview about “a wide variety of matters concerning the
defendant’s offense or offenses of conviction and related uncharged criminal conduct, criminal history, personal history (including family history and substance abuse history), financial
circumstances, and numerous other issues potentially related to
the court’s sentencing decision.”159 The presentence report lists
the offense and the defendant’s information, the punishment
range from the Sentencing Guidelines, and “any bases that may
154. See United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 93 (D. Mass. 2002)
(“How does this human being compare to others the trial court has
seen? . . . How atypical does he or she have to be . . . ? Where ought the line between typical and atypical be? No bright line rule was announced by the Commission; none can be announced by a court.”); Tracy Tyson, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Are Parenthood and Pregnancy
Appropriate Sentencing Considerations?, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD.
577, 595–96 (1993) (“Because the Commission never states the extent to which
it considered family ties and responsibilities, ‘there is really no way of knowing
whether or not the Commission would view the circumstance of this case as
“unusual.”’ . . . The result is a[n] erratic group of sentencing decisions lacking
an underlying policy.” (quoting United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d
Cir. 1989)).
155. See, e.g., Jason Binimow, Annotation, Downward Departure from
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 1A1.1 et seq.) Based On Extraordinary Family Circumstances, 145 A.L.R. FED. 559 (updated 2020) (cataloguing cases from 1988 to 2018 that were either granted or denied a downward
departure based on extraordinary family circumstances); see also Tyson, supra
note 154, at 596–99 (reviewing “an erratic body of decisional law”).
156. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 404–07; see infra note 198 (discussing the
Second Circuit’s receptiveness to family ties and responsibilities departures).
157. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 126, at 5.
158. Id. at 5–6.
159. Id.
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exist for imposing a sentence outside of the applicable range.”160
A sentencing hearing follows, where the court may hear information regarding mitigating factors, before orally announcing a
sentence.161 These mitigating factors, including “extraordinary”
family ties and responsibilities, can make a dramatic difference
in the outcome of a defendant’s case, as sentences entailing dozens of months in prison can be downgraded to result in probation
instead.162
II. THE LIMITED CONSIDERATION OF FAMILY SUPPORT
AND CAREGIVING UNDER FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW
Many courts continue to utilize the “extraordinary” analysis
when considering downward departures for family ties and responsibilities, either under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or
federal sentencing law.163 This analysis does not have clear direction for implementation, is inconsistently applied, and weighs
a family’s uniqueness more heavily than their need for support.
Yet, both before and after United States v. Booker (when the Federal Sentencing Guidelines went from mandatory to advisory),
some federal courts have instead employed a “replaceability” test
to evaluate whether the defendant’s absence creates such negative collateral consequences on their families as to deserve a
downward departure at sentencing.164 This takes a step away
from reviewing the culpability of the defendant, and a step towards according due weight to the effects on incarceration on the
defendant’s family.165 By overlooking the “replaceability” test,
judges miss out on an opportunity to save children from unnecessary parental incarceration and the accompanying consequences.

160. Id. at 6. The imposition of a “sentence outside of the applicable range”
is, as previously mentioned, called a “variance” or a “departure.” Id.
161. Id. at 6–7.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Kon, No. 04 CR, 271-03 (RWS), 2006 WL
3208555 at *1, *3–4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (noting a defendant who pled
guilty to two drug-related felonies, which yielded a Guidelines range of thirty to
thirty-seven months of imprisonment, but due to a successful downward departure, the defendant was only sentenced for one day of incarceration (which she
had already served) and three years of supervised release).
163. See, e.g., id. at *4–5.
164. See e.g., United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98 (D. Mass.
2012).
165. See id.
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A. HOW PARENTS FIT INTO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING REGIME
AFTER BOOKER
As mentioned above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
leave a small pathway166 for family ties and responsibilities to
be considered at sentencing, but only under extraordinary circumstances. The judicial discretion involved in determining
what suffices as “extraordinary” can lead to advantageous outcomes for some, but the inconsistency in its application hurts
many others. As the Guidelines have been demoted and lessened
in their authority, judges have considered utilizing other sentencing provisions to use a defendant’s status as a parent as a
mitigating factor in sentencing.167 Still, the judicial landscape is
rife with inconsistent practices: some judges depart under Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines, while others apply variances under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).168 Whatever provision a sentencing judge
uses, the “extraordinary” analysis continues to be used.169
1. Departures: Sentencing Guidelines Section 5H1.6, Family
Ties and Responsibilities
The Commentary to Section 5H1.6 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines notes that when a judge is determining if a downward departure is appropriate in cases involving loss of caregiving or financial support, they should consider (1) whether the
166. This pathway may appear narrow when courts observe a rigorous definition of “extraordinary” family circumstances, but latest statistics demonstrate
that for all federal sentences granted downward departures from the Guidelines
range, “Family ties and responsibilities (§ 5H1.6)” was the sixth most popular
reason, with 1,697 cases departed for that reason (which constitutes 4.0% of the
total 42,387 reasons given for downward departures in fiscal year 2018, and of
the total 69,425 federal cases in fiscal year 2018, there were 16,179 in which
downward departures were granted). WILLIAM H. PRYOR JR. ET AL., Reasons
Given by Sentencing Courts for Downward Departures from the Guideline
Range, in 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 104, 104 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual
-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G9G-C7S8].
167. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Perez, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277
(D.N.M. 2011) (considering both the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) in analyzing the defendant’s children’s struggles).
168. See id. (“‘Variance’ and ‘departure’ are of course terms of art, and
though the outcome—a non-guidelines sentence—might be the same, different
analyses are required. A departure involves application of Chapter 4 or 5 of the
sentencing guidelines [such as § 5H1.6], while a variance involves consideration
of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” (citations omitted)).
169. See infra notes 170–77 and accompanying text.
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sentence “will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s family,”170 (2) whether “[t]he loss of caretaking or financial
support substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a similarly situated defendant,”171 (3) if there is
“no effective remedial or ameliorative programs” available,
“making the defendant’s caretaking or financial support irreplaceable172 to the defendant’s family,”173 and (4) if “[t]he departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or financial
support.”174 Notably, these criteria point to the effect that the
defendant’s presence or absence has on their family members,175
not on their culpability for the crime they have been charged
with.176

170. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 5H1.6.
171. Id.
172. One judge noted the challenge in determining the exact meaning of the
powerful words in these criteria, focusing on “irreplaceable”:
But this enterprise is not about word games. I see a continuum of cases
representing the adverse impact a defendant’s incarceration can have
on innocent dependants [sic], from the ‘ordinary burdens’ to ‘significantly’ more burdens than usual. The issue is at what point on that
continuum burdens are imposed on innocent dependents that are
simply not justified by our legitimate need to punish the wrongdoer,
that are cruel and unnecessary.
United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98 (D. Mass. 2002).
173. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 5H1.6.
174. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez, No. CR 09-3078 JB, 2011 WL
6828055, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (considering “substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support” as a factor as
the court addressed the appropriateness of “a departure for the loss of caretaking or financial support to the defendant’s family”).
175. See United States v. Trinidad-Toledo, No. CR 06-1646 JB, 2007 WL
506190, at *5 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2007), aff’d, 260 F. App’x 74 (10th Cir. 2008) (“An
examination of the cases denying the departure reveals that a primary consideration is the extent the individual is needed in the home.”).
176. Some courts have noted that incarceration, despite its collateral consequences on family members, is simply the cost a defendant must pay for committing a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 859 F.3d 468, 473 (7th Cir.
2017) (“Every sentencing judge knows that a prison sentence will impose hardships on an offender’s family. Every judge has heard heartrending accounts of
those hardships. The most common response is to . . . [note that] the hardship
was caused by the offender’s decision to commit the crimes for which he is being
sentenced.”); United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 756 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“That’s an unfortunate thing that’s happened to your family [regarding a sick
child with no alternative caregiver], but the fact that [the defendant is absent] . . . is something based on conduct [the defendant] chose to commit. And I
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Many have requested downward departures under Section
5H1.6 (Family Ties and Responsibilities), and despite a freedom
to deviate from the Guidelines, judges oftentimes hold fast to the
“extraordinary” bar that has been set.177 Even with this adherence, the interpretation of “extraordinary” varies widely across
courtrooms. Courts note that an “extraordinary” case is a situation “outside the heartland of similarly situated defendants.”178
Courts often find the incarceration of single parents and primary
caregivers the norm, noting that “[a] sole, custodial parent is not
a rarity in today’s society . . . . [I]n many cases . . . the children
will have to live . . . in foster homes. . . . [The defendant]’s situation, though unfortunate, is simply not out of the ordinary.”179
One court recently noted that it would be willing to depart
in “a situation where the young child has serious health problems and requires constant care,”180 or “if there was no mother
or other family members present to care for the child.”181 Yet, a
defendant with three minor children suffering from various
physical and mental health problems,182 a single mother of two

expressly reject that as a consideration that should somehow mitigate his sentence.”). Other courts have mentioned a concern for proffering special treatment
to defendants who are parents. See, e.g., United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d
1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Imprisoning the mother of a child for even a short
period of time is bound to be a wrenching experience for the child, but the guidelines do not contemplate a discount for parents of children.”).
177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
178. Trinidad-Toledo, 2007 WL 506190, at *5; cf. United States v.
Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Whether a particular case is appropriate for downward departure is a question of its lying ‘outside the heartland,’ that is, outside the ordinary. . . . There is no requirement that the circumstances be extra-ordinary by any particular degree of magnitude . . . . [The
circumstances need not be] extra-extraordinary (i.e., ‘truly extraordinary’ or ‘so
extraordinary’).”).
179. United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990); see United
States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 103 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he unfortunate reality
[is] that single parents often commit crimes requiring incarceration.”).
180. United States v. Justice, No. CR 09-3078 JB, 2012 WL 394455, at *11
(D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012).
181. Id.; see also United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“It may not be unusual, for example, to find that a convicted drug offender is a
single mother with family responsibilities, but, at some point, the nature and
magnitude of family responsibilities (many children? with handicaps? no
money? no place for children to go?) may transform the ‘ordinary’ case of such
circumstances into a case that is not at all ordinary.”).
182. United States v. Valenzuela-Perez, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1276–77
(D.N.M. 2011).
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whose children would go into foster care,183 and a defendant who
was a single mother of five (including a child with a neurological
disorder)184 were denied downward departures. These inconsistent outcomes result in some defendants benefiting from the
criteria, while many others are left in the dust.185
2. Variances: Defendant’s History and Characteristics Under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
One court explained the shift from utilizing Section 5H1.6
of the Guidelines to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors for
family tie evaluations by noting that “[a]lthough ‘[t]he concept of
departures has been rendered obsolete in post-Booker sentencing . . . the district court may apply those departure guidelines
by way of analogy in analyzing the section 3553(a) factors.’”186
Thus, courts have treated § 3553(a) somewhat similarly to the
pre-Booker Section 5H1.6 analyses.187 Federal courts are instructed to “apply the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in
183. Brand, 907 F.2d at 33–34.
184. Sweeting, 213 F.3d at 97, 101–02 (denying a downward departure for a
single mother of five minor children, the oldest of which suffered from Tourette’s
Syndrome).
185. The Huerta court listed a number of cases that were or were not granted
downward departures. United States v. Huerta, 371 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2004).
The Huerta court noted that they granted downward departures in the following
cases: “where defendant was sole provider for his wife (who had a ‘limited earning capacity’ because of her difficulty speaking English) and their two children
(ages 8 and 9)”; “where the defendant was the sole caretaker for her three children and the young child of her institutionalized daughter”; and “where the defendant and his wife were responsible for caring for their two daughters (ages 4
and 11), the defendant’s disabled father (who depended on the defendant to help
him in and out of his wheelchair) and the defendant’s grandmother.” Id. The
court then noted situations where a downward departure was not granted, including a case where there were nearby family members that could assist the
defendant’s wife with childcare; a case where five of the defendant’s six children
were over eighteen, and there was evidence that family members were available
to care for the minor child; and a case where the defendant’s child did not live
with him and his ex-wife earned a $40,000 salary). Id. at 95.
186. United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 756 (7th Cir. 2008) (second
and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d
785, 792 (7th Cir. 2007)).
187. It should be noted that § 3553(a) explicitly references the Guidelines as
a factor for judges to consider. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (“The court, in
determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—. . . (4) the
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—(A) the applicable
category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines . . . .”); see also Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and
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determining whether to apply a sentence within the advisory
guidelines range,”188 including “the history and characteristics
of the defendant.”189 Yet, one federal Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged that while the § 3553(a) factors effectively replaced Section 5H1.6 commentary, the court still focused on the
same aspects (namely, pointing out that “the relevant inquiry is
the effect of the defendant’s absence on his family members”).190
Despite the different verbiage in § 3553(a) focusing on the defendant’s history and characteristics, courts continue to consider
the effect of the defendant’s presence or absence on family members when making family responsibility-related decisions.
B. UNITED STATES V. HUERTA AND UNITED STATES V. KON:
DEFENDANT’S IRREPLACEABILITY
In United States v. Huerta,191 defendant-appellee Albert
Huerta pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiring to submit and
submitting false statements relating to health care matters.192
Huerta had two minor children, an unemployed wife, and provided financial, moral, and physical caretaking support to his
disabled and uninsured father.193 In considering a Section 5H1.6
Family Ties and Responsibilities claim,194 the Second Circuit
was dismayed that the district court failed to expressly address
the replaceability of Huerta’s roles as a physical, emotional, and
financial caretaker for his child and family.195 The court highlighted how crucial replaceability was to its determination regarding if a downward departure in the defendant’s sentence
was appropriate: “this factor—the absence or presence of adults
who can step in during the defendant’s incarceration to assist
the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1174 (“[C]ourts are
awarding more downward departures than previously. In the post-Booker
world . . . ‘[c]onsideration of family responsibilities’ may now be viewed as part
of a defendant’s ‘history and characteristics,’ and judges can assess those traits
as reasons to mitigate the length of sentences.” (third alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1))).
188. Schroeder, 536 F.3d at 755 (quoting Miranda, 505 F.3d at 791).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
190. Schroeder, 536 F.3d at 756.
191. 371 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 90.
193. Id. at 94.
194. Huerta was decided in 2004, before United States v. Booker was decided
in 2005; therefore, the court’s analysis was rooted in the Sentencing Guidelines,
and the court performed its analysis under Section 5H1.6. See id.
195. See id. at 94–95.
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with caring and providing for the defendant’s dependents—is a
central part of the extraordinary family circumstances inquiry.”196 Because the court could not tell if Huerta’s wife could
sustain the family business in Huerta’s absence, or if other adult
family members could assist financially or with childcare, the
court remanded the case to the district court to determine these
facts.197 What would happen to his dependents in his absence
was a major concern for the court.
After Booker, another federal court expressed a keen interest in the replaceability of a defendant’s caretaking and financial
support. In United States v. Kon,198 defendant Yit Tin Kon
pleaded guilty to two felonies related to the possession of and
intention to distribute MDMA.199 Kon had a two-year-old child
with her husband (who also happened to be her co-defendant in
the case) from whom she had separated shortly after they were
both arrested.200 After the separation, their daughter resided
with Kon.201 Her husband provided no financial support to them,

196. Id. at 95.
197. Id.
198. United States v. Kon, No. 1:04-CR-00271, 2006 WL 3208555 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 2, 2006). Kon, similarly to Huerta, was decided within the Second Circuit.
Other scholars have noted that the Second Circuit has historically been one of
the most receptive to family ties and responsibilities departures. See, e.g., Alan
Ellis & Samuel A. Shummon, Let Judges Be Judges! Post-Koon Downward Departures, Part 7: Family Ties and Responsibilities, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1999,
at 48, 50 (“Among the circuits, the Second Circuit has been the most receptive
to downward departures for family ties and responsibilities; in comparison with
other circuit courts, it does not second-guess the factual findings of the lower
courts concerning the extraordinary nature of the defendant’s family circumstances.”); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered
Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 942–43 (1993) (“The Second
Circuit has been favorably inclined towards family based departures. . . . Numerous district court cases within the Second Circuit have granted departures
for single mothers both before and since [United States v.] Johnson, and the
Second Circuit has virtually invited family ties departures for males and females.” (footnote omitted)); Karen R. Smith, United States v. Johnson: The Second Circuit Overcomes the Sentencing Guidelines’ Myopic View of “Not Ordinarily Relevant” Family Responsibilities of the Criminal Offender, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 573, 607 (1993) (“Among the circuits, the Second Circuit seems the most
receptive to the development, even encouragement, of downward departure jurisprudence in [the family ties] area.”).
199. Kon, 2006 WL 3208555, at *1.
200. Id. at *2.
201. Id.
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had “little to no contact with Kon or their daughter,” and threatened Kon that her child would be taken away from her.202 Kon,
an immigrant from Malaysia with a junior high education and a
job washing hair at salons, did not have any immediate family
in the United States to assist with childcare.203
The Kon court acknowledged that in the wake of Booker, it
was obliged to impose a sentence based on consideration of
§ 3553(a) factors, and one such factor was the Guidelines.204
First, the court performed a Guidelines calculation: based on
Kon’s offenses, her acceptance of responsibility, and her criminal
history, the Guidelines yielded a range for imprisonment at
thirty to thirty-seven months; a range of supervised release for
at least three years; and an ineligibility for probation.205 Then,
the court turned to the remaining factors of § 3553(a), including
“the history and characteristics of the defendant,”206 which led
the court to consider “Kon’s extraordinary family circumstances”
as the sole caretaker for her toddler, without family members
available for assistance.207 The court recognized its precedents
for imposing downward departures when incarceration would
“wreak extraordinary destruction” on the dependents that a defendant would have to leave behind in the case of imprisonment.208 The Kon court looked to the Huerta court for the “standard for weighing the severity of the impact of a defendant’s
incarceration upon a family’s circumstances,” reiterating the importance of considering a defendant’s irreplaceability in caregiving and providing for their dependents.209 The Kon court noted:
While the Huerta court emphasized that all families suffer when a family member is incarcerated for any length of time, that expected degree
of suffering is exacerbated exponentially when no other adult in the
family can provide alternative means of assistance or support for the
defendant’s dependents. . . . [W]hen no such reasonable alternative is
available, and the defendant is the sole care-taker of his or her dependents, a sentencing court can exercise its discretion under a finding of
extraordinary family circumstances.210

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2018)).
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Id. at *5.
Id.
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The court then found extraordinary circumstances sufficient
for either a downward departure under Section 5H1.6 or a nonGuidelines sentence pursuant to the defendant’s history and
characteristics under § 3553(a)(1).211 After consideration of the
other § 3553(a) factors (including “the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the offense”212 and “provid[ing] adequate general and specific deterrence,”213) Kon was given a nonGuidelines sentence of one day of incarceration (which she had
already served by that point) and three years of supervised release.214
The Kon court solidified that even after Booker, the Second
Circuit’s test for extraordinary family circumstances (under either Section 51H.6 or § 3553(a)) was a defendant’s replaceability
as a caregiver and provider for their dependents. Kon wasn’t the
only court to highlight the importance of a defendant’s irreplaceability, but the fact that Kon occurred after Booker sends a message to other federal courts that the irreplaceability test is still
a valid standard to use.215 The old “extraordinary” test needlessly focused on the unusualness of a family’s circumstances, as

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *6.
215. Several other courts have also focused on irreplaceability in making
sentencing decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Daidone, 124 F. App’x 677, 679
(2d Cir. 2005) (citing six additional cases that consider defendant’s irreplaceability for their dependents); United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir.
2004) (“[W]e have upheld departures in limited circumstances where a defendant was so irreplaceable that incarceration would cause exceptional hardship to
his family.”); United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[C]ourts
have affirmed departures where the evidence established that the care rendered
by the defendant was irreplaceable.”); United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790,
797 (8th Cir. 1994) (granting a downward departure where husband was an
“irreplaceable” part of his wife’s treatment plan for her “severe” and “potentially
life threatening” psychiatric problems); United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970,
972, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming a downward departure where the minor child
with whom defendant lived, who suffered from psychological disorders, “would
risk regression and harm if defendant were incarcerated” and defendant’s “continued presence was ‘necessary for [the child’s] increasing progress’”); United
States v. Davis, No. 3:06-CR-00111, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (D. Conn. July 31,
2006); United States v. Roberts, No. 01-CR-410, 2005 WL 1153757, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2005) (“[Defendant] has satisfied the Second Circuit’s Huerta
test.”); United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Before a court . . . can depart downward for ‘extraordinary family obligations’ the
trial court must measure the defendant against all other defendants, no matter
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opposed to the family’s needs, and was not consistently or clearly
implemented. In contrast, the “irreplaceability” test provides an
opportunity to take the defendant’s support for their dependents
into account and gives greater weight to a defendant’s role as a
caregiver. This allows for consideration of what the effects of incarceration will be for a defendant’s dependents and a chance to
mitigate the harm to the family. A more widespread use of the
“irreplaceability” test could increase the number of parents who
are able to stay in their homes with their families, instead of being needlessly incarcerated.
III. A JUDICIAL TOOL FOR FEDERAL DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES: PRESUMING REASONABLENESS IN
ABSENCE OF REPLACEMENT CARETAKER OR PROVIDER
CASES
Parents who provide care and financial support to their dependents face an uphill battle in proving their circumstances to
be sufficiently “extraordinary” to cause a judge to deviate from
normal sentencing patterns. As with other areas involving judicial discretion, the differing methods of analysis lead to a lack of
clarity for parties and inconsistent outcomes across jurisdictions.
Fortunately, several remedies have been proposed to address
this issue. This Part will review prior scholarship on ideas to
bring greater justice into this realm, as well as propose a novel
solution based on federal precedent. Section C will also address
counterarguments related to the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants.
A. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE PARENTAL INCARCERATION
PROBLEM: A REVIEW
As the era of mass incarceration continues, and the proportion of incarcerated mothers increases, conversation around the
issue of incarcerated parents and the effects on their children
has grown.216 It is not merely the fact that many parents are being incarcerated that is concerning, but rather that there are
pathways judges may take to avoid incarcerating parents or to
incarcerate them for shorter lengths of time (in appropriate situations) that are not utilized, and the result is parents needlessly incarcerated (and children needlessly separated from their
the crime of his or her conviction, and determine whether he or she is ‘irreplaceable.’”).
216. See supra Part I.A.2.
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parents). Other scholars have researched and detailed several
proposed solutions to address this issue, and they deserve mention here.217 These solutions offer practical and innovative remedies to address excessive parental incarceration, but some of
them may prove difficult to implement.
1. Amending the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Section
5H1.6)
Emily W. Andersen advocates for an amendment to Section
5H1.6 of the Guidelines, which would lead to greater consideration of alternatives to incarceration.218 One (seemingly) simple
solution to address the inconsistent interpretation of “extraordinary” circumstances among jurisdictions,219 while highlighting
the importance of family responsibilities, is to amend the Guidelines to allow for a lower bar than “extraordinary.”220 Although
the Guidelines are no longer binding on federal judges, because

217. Note that these solutions, and indeed this Note, focus on federal sentencing and federal solutions to this issue. While most incarceration happens at
the state and local level, see Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 34 (noting that approximately 83% of people incarcerated in the United States are in local jails or
state prisons), federal systems can have far-reaching impact by influencing
state policymakers. For a discussion of how states have adopted similar
schemes, see Markel et al., supra note 187, at 1175–78.
218. See Emily W. Andersen, Note, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing
Family Responsibilities to the Federal Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501,
1530–33 (2015). In addition to amending Section 5H1.6, Anderson asserts “revisions to section 5H1.6 should indicate that, in some circumstances, alternative
sentences can and should be considered. . . . Such alternatives may provide a
more efficient way of achieving the same result—punishment of an offender—
without causing negative impacts on an offender’s family.” Id. at 1532–33 (footnote omitted). Andersen also advocates for family impact statements to be
added to presentence investigation reports. See id. at 1533–35.
219. See id. at 1521 (“This interpretive disparity [concerning ‘extraordinary’
circumstances] has persisted even after the U.S. Supreme Court rendered the
Guidelines advisory in 2005, in United States. [sic] v. Booker.”). “Revising the
Guidelines would resolve discrepancies in courts’ interpretations of extraordinary or unusual family ties.” Id. at 1531.
220. The Guidelines, which currently read, “In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense other than an offense described in the following paragraph,
family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a departure may be warranted,” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note
144, § 5H1.6, could be edited to strike “not ordinarily relevant” and replace it
with “may be relevant.”; see also Andersen, supra note 218, at 1531–32.
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many federal judges continue to follow the Guidelines,221 and
they continue to be considered under § 3553(a) analysis, amending the Guidelines to more explicitly provide for a judge’s consideration of a defendant’s role in the lives of their dependents will
likely lead to more judges taking the analysis more seriously.
While this suggestion is appealing, Amy B. Cyphert notes
several concerns with its implementation.222 First, amending the
Guidelines may bring about debates regarding unfair treatment
for similarly situated defendants;223 the “extraordinary” bar
served as a gatekeeper, making downward departures for family
ties an exception, not the rule. Lowering the standard could create a scheme where parents are systematically favored. Second,
critics may assert that too many parents or caregivers may be
eligible for the departure, incentivizing those who have committed (or plan to commit) crimes to become pregnant as a get-outof-jail-free card.224 Finally, Cyphert highlights the unlikelihood
of successful legislative and administrative action given the current political climate.225

221. See Cyphert, supra note 99, at 402 (noting that since Booker, judges
sentencing defendants within the Guidelines (or below the range after a request
from the government) has “stabiliz[ed] at above eighty percent”).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 410–11 (“The question of whether parents should receive a lessened or alternative sentence because of their status as parents is . . . a controversial one. Some commentators have argued that to do so would be to violate
principles of equal protection, and even incentivize . . . ‘irreplaceable caregivers’ . . . to engage in criminal behavior.” (footnote omitted)).
224. Id. at 406 (“In its opinion, the court noted federal courts’ reluctance to
grant downward departures where female defendants became pregnant subsequent to their arrests or convictions, in part because to do so is to ‘send[ ] an
obvious message to all female defendants that pregnancy is ‘a way out.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. McMahill, No. 06-216, 2013 WL
2186981, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2013))).
225. See id. at 413 (“[P]rogress on these issues is increasingly unlikely under
the Trump Administration . . . .”). Cyphert further explains that “the Sentencing Commission seeking amendment of a legislative provision from Congress,
Congress following through, the Commission recommending the appropriate
amendment to the Guidelines as a result, and Congress approving the amendment—is extraordinarily unlikely in the foreseeable future.” Id. at 416.
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2. Family Impact Assessments in Presentence Investigation
Reports
Andersen (and others226) also argues for incorporating family impact assessments into the sentencing process through
presentence investigation reports by amending Rule 32 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.227 A family impact statement is a set of questions incorporated into presentence investigation reports to solicit information regarding the defendant’s
children and family members, as well as his or her roles in and
responsibilities to the family.228 Family impact statements help
decisionmakers by providing more information about the defendant’s family, as well as the roles and contributions the defendant
provides, and what the potential effect would be if the defendant
were incarcerated.229 Andersen hypothesizes that having this information would help judges to understand a defendant’s life holistically (while still retaining the discretion to determine if the
circumstance called for a downward departure).230 Several jurisdictions have already successfully adopted the practice of using
family impact statements, and probation officers could incorporate the family impact statement inquiry into their role as investigators for the court.231

226. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, supra note 96, at 45 (“Recommendations and Action Steps . . . Family Impact Assessment in Judicial Hearings: Establish a protocol for assessing family impact at sentencing and what
can be done to alleviate undue stress on the children.”); Christian, supra note
21, at 8 (“States could require, in appropriate cases, that pre-sentence investigation reports include a family impact statement, including recommendations
for the ‘least detrimental alternative’ sentence and for services to and supports
for children during a parent’s imprisonment.”).
227. See Andersen, supra note 218, at 1533–35.
228. See LINDSEY CRAMER ET AL., URBAN INST., TOOLKIT FOR DEVELOPING
FAMILY IMPACT STATEMENTS: CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS PROJECT
3 (2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/53651/2000253
-Toolkit-for-Developing-Family-Impact-Statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX4X
-KA6Q].
229. Id.
230. Andersen, supra note 218, at 1515–16 (“Although some of the information provided in a family impact assessment is already included in a presentence investigation report, the family impact assessment brings together this
scattered information, sometimes supplementing it with additional details, in
order to foreground the burden a sentence will place on the defendant’s family.”); id. at 1533–34.
231. Id. at 1534–35.
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Cyphert again expresses concern with this solution, noting
that,
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a complicated and time consuming process that involves Congress, the
Supreme Court, advisory committees, and public notice and comment. . . . [R]eliance on rule change as a method of addressing the challenges faced by incarcerated parents and their children may be misplaced.232

Instead, Cyphert suggests the more moderate fix that individual
judges could use their power to require family impact statements
in their own courtrooms.233 Cyphert’s solution empowers judges
to gather the information they need for just decision making
without the burden of amending laws.
3. Policy Improvements
Numerous sources investigating the effects of incarcerating
parents cite various policy solutions to mitigate the harm on children and families. Innovative programs allowing mothers to remain with their infants in prison nurseries or community-based
residential parenting programs have shown great promise,234
and expanding the eligibility pool of such programs would serve
even more families.235 Nine states have had prison nurseries,
and such nurseries have existed in the United States for over
100 years.236 These unique opportunities provide strong incentives for parent participants to remain in good standing by following the prison rules.237 It is possible that prison nurseries
232. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 411–12 (footnote omitted).
233. Id. at 418. Cyphert specifically advocates for judges to use Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32(d)(2)(G), which “requires that the presentence investigation report include ‘any other information that the court requires, including
information relevant to the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),’” to mandate a
section about collateral consequences in the presentence report, which would
include consequences for dependents. Id. at 420 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(d)(2)(G)).
234. See Halter, supra note 108, at 549–51, 557–64 (explaining that a parent’s constitutional right to parent should be honored by allowing the parent to
live with their infant, noting how this regime would be compatible with the
criminal justice system, and listing policy justifications).
235. See KAREN SHAIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S MOTHER-INFANT PRISON PROGRAMS: AN INVESTIGATION 21 (2010), https://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CA-Mother-Infant-Prison-Programs_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FNM4-XNKA] (recommending such an expansion).
236. SARAH DIAMOND, PRISON NURSERY PROGRAMS: LITERATURE REVIEW
AND FACT SHEET FOR CT 1 (2012), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/f2f533_
fc7cfce398854a27a5b2c65feb8a8efc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AUK-3WB4].
237. Id. at 3.
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may be comparable in price to the cost of foster care, and with
separate areas for mothers and young children protecting them
from violence, a mother who would like to raise her child while
incarcerated could be afforded the invaluable opportunity to
spend vital attachment time with her infant.238
When cohabitation is not feasible, visitation can be an important point of contact for children and their parents, mitigating some of the harms of separation.239 Incarceration facilities
can improve their visitation policies by explicitly encouraging
and enabling children to participate in the visitation program,
avoiding onerous clothing requirements for visitors, allowing for
toys and age-appropriate activities in the visitation spaces, permitting appropriate physical contact, timing visiting hours to
make sense with work and school schedules, expanding visiting
hours, and partnering with local nonprofit organizations.240
States can also inquire where a child will be living during the
period of incarceration and work to place incarcerated parents in
facilities closer to their children to ease the traveling burden for
children and their caregivers.241
Funding for greater governmental support to children of incarcerated parents and resources for family caregivers, such as
reunification services and financial assistance, would also assist
families.242 Intermittent sentencing can allow parents to serve
their sentences in smaller chunks of time instead of all at once,
such as weekdays from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM.243 Finally, greater
238. Jennifer Warner, Note, Infants in Orange: An International ModelBased Approach to Prison Nurseries, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 89–90
(2015).
239. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 394–95 (“Numerous studies have concluded
that frequent and high quality visits between incarcerated parents and their
children are beneficial for both . . . . Visits have also been shown to reduce recidivism rates amongst incarcerated parents and improve long-term success
upon reentry.”).
240. Id. at 422–26.
241. Christian, supra note 21, at 8.
242. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 15,
at 11 (“Recommendations . . . To the Congress of the United States . . . Pass legislation to provide targeted support to children with incarcerated parents, reunification services for incarcerated parents, and financial assistance and other
resources to family caregivers.”).
243. Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant’s Children at Sentencing, 2
FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 198 (1990). For example, when twenty-year-old Monalisa
Perez accidentally shot and killed her boyfriend (and the father of her two children) Pedro Ruiz III during a YouTube stunt gone wrong, the judge “allowed
Perez to serve her sentence in 10-day increments in South Dakota, where she
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use of alternatives to incarceration in general would afford parents the opportunity to continue living in their communities,
providing a sense of normalcy for their children.244
4. Cementing the Constitutional Right To Parent for the
Incarcerated
Amongst the emotional anguish, logistical challenges, and
serious risk of termination of parental rights that comes along
with parental incarceration, displacement of a child, and the potential for foster care, there is one missing component: a protection of the parent’s constitutional right to parent. Unfortunately,
the United States justice system does not value the fundamental
right to parent for prisoners. The Supreme Court has recognized
a fundamental right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,245 to raise, parent, and control one’s child.246 Parents have
a right to make decisions related to healthcare, child labor, discipline (including corporal punishment), where the child lives,247

now lives.” Tu-Uyen Tran, Minnesota Woman Sentenced for Fatally Shooting
Boyfriend in Failed YouTube Stunt, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS, https://
www.twincities.com/2018/03/14/minnesota-woman-sentenced-for-fatally
-shooting-boyfriend-in-failed-youtube-stunt/ [https://perma.cc/D4X9-HJ9C]
(last updated Mar. 15, 2018); see also State v. Perez, 54-CR-17-185 (D. Minn.
June 28, 2017).
244. Julie Smyth, Dual Punishment: Incarcerated Mothers and Their Children, III COLUM. SOCIAL WORK REV. 33, 41 (2012).
245. See generally, Roger M. Baron, A Parent’s Constitutional Right to Possession of His Children, 7 PROB. L.J. 251 (1987).
246. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (“[S]o long as a
parent adequately cares for [their] children (i.e., is fit), there will . . . be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning
the . . . children.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (finding another education statute (requiring children to
attend public schools instead of religious ones) unconstitutional, noting that
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399,
401 (1923) (finding an education statute (forbidding schools from teaching children foreign languages) an unconstitutional infringement with a parent’s right
“to control the education of their own,” and that due process protections include
the right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
247. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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who they can speak with, and so on.248 Ordinarily, the government defers to parental prerogatives in nearly all aspects of a
child’s life,249 unless two parents are in a dispute, or a parent is
unfit or unable to continue caring for their child.250 As with other
fundamental protections the Court has identified, the right to
parent is well documented and protected in the United States.251
In general, the incarcerated have all of the “rights which
have not been taken away from them expressly or by necessary
implication of law.”252 They “retain the essence of human dignity
inherent in all persons,”253 yet they do not retain rights that are

248. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 141–48 (2014).
These rights apply to parents that still have legal rights over their child or children.
249. There are some government regulations that take precedence over parental prerogatives, such as state compulsory education laws. See generally
RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS
AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 1:6 COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND SCHOOL
REGULATION (2004); limitations on child labor, 29 CFR § 570.2 (2019), 29 CFR
§§ 570.31–34 (2019); and prohibitions against abuse and neglect. See Definitions
of Child Abuse and Neglect in Federal Law, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/can/defining/federal/ [https://perma.cc/
XU29-5N32].
250. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69 (noting that the State will not “inject itself
into the private realm of the family” when a parent or parents are “fit”). Parental prerogatives are not deferred to in custody disputes (as each parent’s prerogatives may be in stark contrast with the other’s); instead, the “best interest
of the child” standard is generally used. Donald K. Sherman, Child Custody and
Visitation, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 691, 701 (2005) (“If parents are unable to
reach a child custody agreement . . . courts may intervene in custody and visitation disputes. The standard for deciding these cases is the ‘best interest of the
child standard’; it is the same in all fifty states.”).
251. For a robust discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment right to parent,
see Halter, supra note 108, at 553–57.
252. RUSSELL J. DAVIS, 73 OHIO JURIS., PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, § 145 CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF INMATES, GENERALLY
(Lexis 2018). Prisoners in the United States retain many important constitutional protections (but usually with many caveats and limitations), such as the
“right of meaningful access to courts”; First Amendment rights of speech, religion, and association; very limited (but still preserved) privacy rights; Eighth
Amendment protection against “cruel and unusual” punishment; procedural
due process protections; and rights to equal protection. Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1025, 1025–28, 1031,
1038–41, 1054, 1064 (2012).
253. DAVIS, supra note 252.
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“inconsistent with status as a prisoner or with legitimate penological objectives.”254 But amongst the prisoner’s right to other
family connections, such as the right to get married,255 the
United States does not recognize a parent’s right to visit with
their child,256 much less communicate with them. Incarceration,
therefore, is not just a period of limited liberty, but a dangerous
zone of unprotected rights and risk of damaging or severing a
parent-child relationship.
Enforcing the fundamental right to parent could be a possible avenue for securing more protections and options for incarcerated parents. Emily Halter argues that “incarcerated women
have a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
parent their children. Consequently, state and federal prisons in
the United States should be required to provide options to facilitate that right.”257 Halter explains that Supreme Court precedent dictates that a mother’s constitutional right to parent her
children can only be revoked if she is found to be unfit.258 Incarceration alone does not imply an inability to parent well (or a
history of poor parenting), especially given the prevalence of incarceration due to low-level drug offenses and nonviolent
crimes.259 Halter advocates for allowing incarcerated women to
remain with their children during incarceration through prison
nurseries and “community-based residential parenting programs.”260 Even if courts are unwilling or unable to vindicate
this right, she adds, legislatures should take the lead in making
important and impactful policy changes to implement better options for incarcerated mothers and their children.261 Again, unfortunately, this proposal requires courts or legislatures to take
big leaps and advocate fiercely for a politically weak population.
254. Id.; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (noting that an
inmate “retains those [constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
255. Safley, 482 U.S. at 96 (finding that prisoners maintain the constitutional right to marry).
256. George L. Blum, Annotation, Right of Jailed or Imprisoned Parent to
Visit from Minor Child, 6 A.L.R.6th 483 (2005); see also Cyphert, supra note 99,
at 409 (noting “the daunting Supreme Court precedents that provide essentially
no right to visitation for inmates”).
257. Halter, supra note 108, at 553.
258. Id. at 554 (referencing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
259. Id. at 554–55.
260. Id. at 544.
261. Id. at 545, 561–64.
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These ideas have yet to be enacted on a national scale. While
there is recent a senate bill262 (and a mirrored house bill263) that
makes some policy changes (codifying special rights for visitations, parenting classes, and free phone and video calls264), neither bill has made much progress towards being enacted.265 With
a closely divided Senate266 and a president that prides himself
on enforcing “law and order,”267 it is uncertain if any of these
changes will be enacted anytime soon. However, recent bipartisan support for the passage of a criminal justice reform bill268
may indicate that the time is now for criminal laws to adapt with
the changing times.
Each of these proposed solutions holds promise, and all are
worthy of pursuit. Yet many of these suggestions require considerable change, effort, and political cooperation. Parental incarceration and the ensuing family separation affects millions of
parents and children, so the need for reform is urgent.

262. Next Step Act of 2019, S. 697, 116th Cong. (2019).
263. Next Step Act of 2019, H.R. 1893, 116th Cong. (2019).
264. S. 697 § 602; H.R. 1893 § 602 (2019).
265. As of January 13, 2020, S. 697 had zero cosponsors and H.R. 1893 had
two. See Bill Cosponsor S.697, CONG.GOV., https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th
-congress/senate-bill/697cosponsers/ [https://perma.ccZ2G8-R4UA]; Bill Cosponsor H.R. 1893, CONG.GOV., https://www.congress.gov/bill116th-congress/
house-bill/1893/cosponsors/ [https://perma.cc/7ZTJ-HP2Z].
266. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv
.htm [https://perma.cc/SU8K-UBTQ] (noting fifty-three Republicans and fortyfive Democrats in the 2019–21 Senate).
267. Terence McArdle, The ‘Law and Order’ Campaign that Won Richard
Nixon the White House 50 Years Ago, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/11/05/law-order-campaign-that-won-richard
-nixon-white-house-years-ago/?utm_term=.3f08cbc1d271 [https://perma.cc/
28LS-J3KF] (“Donald Trump invoked the phrase ‘silent majority’ during his
presidential run and, lately, has seized on another Nixon favorite: ‘law and order.’”).
268. See First Step Act of 2018, S. Res. 756, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/756 [https://perma.cc/
5BLG-ERV3]; German Lopez, Congress Just Passed the Most Significant Criminal Justice Reform Bill in Decades, VOX (Dec. 20, 2018, 1:55 PM), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/20/18148482/first-step-act-criminal
-justice-reform-house-congress [https://perma.cc/WA34-L8UM] (detailing the
passage of the First Step Act).
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B. JUDICIAL ACTION: DEFENDANT’S STATUS AS PRIMARY
CARETAKER OF DEPENDENT(S) AS PRESUMPTIVELY REASONABLE
GROUNDS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE
Huerta and Kon provide a dormant remedy that has yet to
gain attention by the legal academic and policy communities
(although some other courts269 have followed the “irreplaceability” test articulated in Huerta and Kon). These federal cases
stand for the notion that in an analysis of a defendant’s caregiving and financial support to their dependents (under either a
Section 5H1.6 Family Ties and Responsibilities or a section
3553(a) defendant history and characteristics analysis), the primary issue is how the defendant’s dependents will fare in the
absence of the defendant’s caretaking and financial support services. Kon asserts that “[w]hen no other adult in the family can
provide alternative means of assistance or support for the defendant’s dependents,” it is reasonable for the court to find “extraordinary” family circumstances and grant a downward departure.270
This test, which boils down to labeling an irreplaceable271
caregiver defendant as an “extraordinary” family circumstance,
requires no new laws, but merely following federal district and
circuit court precedent. In fact, the test could be viewed as
merely an extension of preexisting factors in Section 5H1.6,272 a

269. See supra note 215.
270. United States v. Kon, No. 1:04-CR-00271, 2006 WL 3208555, at *5
(S.D.N.Y 2006).
271. For another scholar noting the prevalence of “irreplaceability” analysis,
see Markel et al., supra note 187, at 1172–73 (“To the extent that there is pattern underlying the pre-Booker federal cases involving downward departures
for family ties, it is discernible by asking whether the defendant provided an irreplaceable (or at least critical) role as caregiver to family dependents.”).
272. Section 5H1.6 provides:
(B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial Support.—A
departure under this policy statement based on the loss of caretaking
or financial support of the defendant’s family requires . . . the presence
of the following circumstances: (i) The defendant’s service of a sentence
within the applicable guideline range will cause a substantial, direct,
and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support,
to the defendant’s family. (ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a similarly situated defendant . . . . (iii) The loss of caretaking
or financial support is one for which no effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably are available, making the defendant’s caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to the defendant’s family.
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component of the Guidelines which must be considered under
§ 3553(a).273 This test has the potential to gain traction274
through individual judges invoking Huerta and/or Kon as justifications for their decisions.275 The solidification of the test
through greater usage across district and circuit courts (or, perhaps, the Supreme Court) would carry the advantage that it will
signal to other judges that utilizing the test will be presumed
“reasonable,”276 potentially lessening any fears lower court
judges may have of being overturned.277 “Irreplaceability” need
not be a strict or singular path towards a downward departure
(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or financial support.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 463
273. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4)–(5) (2018).
274. As of January 2020, just five federal cases (all in New York) have cited
Kon. See, e.g., United States v. Marsh, 820 F. Supp. 2d 320, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citing Kon as a case “imposing a non-guidelines sentence in light of family circumstances where defendant was the mother of a two year-old daughter and the
father was no longer involved in raising the child”), as amended (Nov. 3, 2011).
Huerta has been cited (as of January 2020) by thirty-one other cases (including
Kon), but only five cases reference Huerta for its “irreplaceability” test. United
States v. Daidone, 124 F. App’x 677, 679 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Daidone, 112 F. App’x 104, 105 (2d Cir. 2004), order amended and superseded, 124
F. App’x 677 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Bueno, No. 09 CR 625(HB), 2010
WL 2228570, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2010); United States v. Davis, Crim. No.
3-06-CR-111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006); United
States v. Roberts, No. 01 CR, 410(RWS), 2005 WL 1153757, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May
16, 2005). An additional case cites Huerta more broadly, but still under a family
ties departure analysis. United States v. Cabrera, CR No. 07-077-ML, 2009 WL
1530703, at *3 (D.R.I. May 28, 2009).
275. While a more formalized solidification of the irreplaceability test is possible, for reasons cited in Part III.A above, they are not likely to happen anytime
soon. An amendment to the Guidelines would be unlikely as it is a challenging
process that does not invoke much hope without strong indicators of Congress
and the United States Sentencing Commissions’ intent to make such reforms.
Nor does it appear that the Supreme Court of the United States will soon take
this issue under its purview. Therefore, this Note will focus instead on individual judges taking up the irreplaceability test. For notes about the challenges of
amending the Guidelines, see Cyphert, supra note 99, at 413–16.
276. United States v. Booker invalidated the prior appellate review standards by excising § 3742(e), shifting the appellate review standard from de novo
review to “review for ‘unreasonable[ness].’” 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005).
277. “[M]any federal judges in the years since [Booker] have hewed rather
tightly to the Guidelines, with compliance stabilizing at above eighty percent.
Various theories for this phenomenon have been suggested, including fear of
non-Guidelines sentences being overturned (as predicted by Justice Souter in
his dissent in Rita) . . .” Cyphert, supra note 99, at 402–03 (referring to Justice
Souter’s dissent in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)).
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for family ties and responsibilities, but departures resulting
from irreplaceable defendants should be presumed reasonable.278
There is much room for further articulating what criteria
should be applied for determining what “irreplaceable” means.
For example, courts could consider the defendant’s special skills,
characteristics, or relationships as important components of
their caregiving. Courts might also see if there is a willing and
appropriate substitute available to provide care for dependents
if the defendant is incarcerated. The cost of the defendant’s incarceration could be compared to the cost of hiring a replacement
caregiver or compared to the lost income a family would experience if a defendant were incarcerated. Statements from dependents, and those who would have to provide additional support in
the defendant’s absence, could be taken into consideration. Additional attention may be afforded to dependents that are ill, disabled, or otherwise require specialized or difficult care. Defendants could be given an opportunity to explain to the court why
their presence in their homes and communities would bring
greater public safety than their incarceration. A judge will be
able to make the most just ruling given a full articulation of
every negative consequence of incarceration (such as lost caregiving and financial support, the literal costs of housing someone
in a jail or prison, as well as strain on alternative caregivers and
communities) as well as every positive effect of allowing a defendant to avoid incarceration (such as family and community
preservation). Judges may consider all of these factors and more
in considering whether a defendant is irreplaceable, and in appropriate cases, relieving a defendant and their family of a needlessly burdensome incarceration. As more judges utilize the irreplaceability test and articulate the factors important to their
278. The 2002 Federal District of Massachusetts case United States v.
Lacarubba criticized the United States v. Pereira court for too stringently holding to the “irreplaceability” standard, especially as compared to the Second Circuit, which had found sufficient reason for family tie departures without a strict
finding of irreplaceability. United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94–
96 (D. Mass. 2002). Lacarubba noted that finding a replacement caregiver is not
always a sufficient replacement: “Caretaking, in short, goes beyond physical
acts, and includes emotional and psychological attachments. It is not just a
question of any two arms, any old paycheck. A husband of thirty years stands
in a different position relative to a wife than any caregiver.” Id. at 98. Similarly,
this Note does not advocate for such a strict adherence to the “irreplaceability”
test as to exclude those whose care could potentially be replaced by a hired caregiver but would result in a hardship for the dependent who requires care.
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analysis, the test will become clearer for future courts and parties to use.
The concretization of the irreplaceable defendant test would
impact the disparate outcomes for parent-defendants across
courts, particularly in regard to single parents and sole care providers. While the Second Circuit certainly maintains a pattern
of acknowledging the plight of single parents or parents caring
for their entire households,279 still many other judges have denied departures for these caretakers and providers.280 Considering the prevalence of parental incarceration, the growth of maternal incarceration, and the accompanying harms to children,
parents, and the communities, it is sensible and prudent to encourage (through formal or informal means) judges to utilize existing federal precedent to take a defendant’s dependents into
consideration at sentencing.
C. COUNTERARGUMENT: DISPARATE TREATMENT OF SIMILARLY
SITUATED DEFENDANTS
Critics may assert that consideration of the support a defendant provides for their dependents creates a scheme in which
similarly situated defendants (as in, defendants who committed
the same or similar crimes) would have different sentences,281 or
279. United States v. Kon references three Second Circuit cases where departures were upheld for such reasons: (1) “where defendant provided substantial support for two children and defendant’s wife spoke limited English,”
United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1035 (2d Cir.1997), (2) “where defendant was sole supporter of four young children,” United States v. Johnson, 964
F.2d 124, 129–30 (2d Cir. 1992), and (3) “where defendant supported wife, two
young children, and his disabled father, who relied on defendant to get out of
his wheelchair” United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1991)).
United States v. Kon, No. 1:04-CR-00271, 2006 WL 3208555, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov 2, 2006).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Trinidad-Toledo, No. CR 06-1646 JB, 2007
WL 506190, at *1 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2007), aff’d, 260 F. App’x 74 (10th Cir. 2008)
(declining to grant a downward departure, despite the fact that the defendant
was “the sole source of income and support for his disabled wife . . . and his
eight-year old daughter”); United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 807–08 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (denying a downward departure where defendant was “a single father
of two young children who might be placed in foster care if [Defendant]’s brother
refuse[d] to take them into his home”); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33–
34 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying downward departure for a single mother of two children who would go into foster care if she were incarcerated).
281. See, e.g., Cyphert, supra note 99, at 410 (“The question of whether parents should receive a lessened or alternative sentence because of their status as
parents is, of course, a controversial one. Some commentators have argued that
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may perversely incentivize certain defendants to commit
crimes.282 Some may say that prison nurseries, even if they could
be cost-effective and safe for children, detract from the purpose
of punishing the defendant.283 These criticisms evoke questions
of basic fairness, the intention of punishment in the United
States legal system, the consequences of having children or remaining childless, and who bears the burden of punishment.
If United States federal sentencing law was only concerned
with proportionally punishing the defendant’s crime, then this
disparity would be an improper result. Defendants with children
or dependent family members could get an unfair advantage
over other defendants who committed the same or similar offense. In fact, one of the aims of the Sentencing Guidelines is to
lessen disparities among similarly situated defendants.284 The

to do so would be to violate principles of equal protection . . . .”); Markel et
al., supra note 187, at 1215 (“A person who commits a crime can reasonably
foresee that if prosecuted and punished, his punishment will affect not only
himself but also his family. Just about everyone acknowledges that extending a
discount to an offender for a reason unrelated to his crime constitutes an undeserved windfall.”).
282. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 410–11 (noting commentators’ concerns that
alternative or lessened sentences for parents could “incentivize certain groups
of people (namely ‘irreplaceable caregivers’) to engage in criminal behavior,”
and citing a federal court’s concern for “sending an obvious message to all female
defendants that pregnancy is ‘a way out’”) (quoting United States v. Pozzy, 902
F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990)); Markel et al., supra note 187, at 1215 (“[G]iving
benefits to defendants with family ties in the currency of sentencing discounts
will also, on the margin, incentivize this class of defendants to seek out greater
criminal opportunities, or they will be recruited or pressed into action by others.”).
283. Warner, supra note 238, at 90 (“Empowering mothers to make a choice
about their newborn and possibly raise their newborn during a prison sentence
is in opposition to what the United States criminal justice system is trying to
achieve.”).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2018) (“The court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider— . . . (6) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct.”); see also OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, 47–48 (2016), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2016_Primer_Departure_
Variance.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6ZV-S4CT] (noting that a “district court [is] not
‘forbidden to consider the guidelines and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities when exercising its discretion; to the contrary, ‘the governing
statute directs the sentencing court to consider these matters as two factors
among several in the sentencing process’” (quoting United States v. RuelasMendez, 556 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 2009))). However, an Eighth Circuit court
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advantage for those defendants with children necessarily results
in a disadvantage for those who are childless, arbitrarily rewarding those who have exercised their right to have a child and punishing those who have not exercised this right.
However, the unlawful act alone is not the only consideration at sentencing. Both the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “Factors To Be
Considered in Imposing a Sentence”285 and the Sentencing
Guidelines286 take factors besides the defendant’s crime into account, such as “the history and characteristics of the defendant,”287 consideration of specific offender characteristics,288 the
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,289 and if a proposed sentence “will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s
recently found that the effort to avoid unwarranted disparities referred to national disparities, not differences between the sentences of co-conspirators.
Roger W. Haines, Jr. et al., Federal Sentencing Guide: § 716 Departures: Disparity Between Co-Defendants, FED. SENTENCING GUIDE, https://
sentencingcases.com/700-departures-generally-§5k/715-specific-grounds-for
-departure-§5k2/716-disparity-between-co-defendants [https://perma.cc/5EYV
-J3NN]; see United States v. Hemsher, 893 F.3d 525, 535 (8th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 470 (2018) (“[Defendant] argues the great disparity between
his sentence and those of the cooperating co-defendants is evidence that his sentence is unreasonable. . . . However, [defendant]’s argument founders [sic] on
the mistaken premise that the statutory direction to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants refers to differences among co-conspirators. It does not.”); United States v. Pierre, 870 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2017)
(“The statutory direction to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants,
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(6), refers to national disparities, not differences among coconspirators.”).
285. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
286. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 376, 458–65.
287. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
288. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 144, at 458–65 (listing the following
as potentially relevant offender characteristics in sentencing: age, education
and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, physical condition (“Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addiction”), employment record, family ties and responsibilities, role in the offense, criminal history, “Dependence upon Criminal Activity for a Livelihood,” and “Military,
Civic, Charitable, or Public Service; Employment-Related Contributions; Record of Prior Good Works;” but prohibiting consideration of “Race, Sex, National
Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status” as relevant factors). But
see id. at 470–71 (noting that certain factors may only be taken under consideration under specific provisions, such as taking “defendant’s acceptance of responsibility” into consideration under § 3E1.1, and taking “defendant’s aggravating or mitigating role in the offense” into consideration under § 3B1.1 and
§ 3B1.2).
289. Id. at 376.
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family.”290 Federal judges are instructed to review “the need for
the sentence imposed” in terms of proportionality, deterrence,
and the most effective treatment.291 Therefore, the sentencing
structure was never intended to be a direct comparison of the
culpability of two defendants based exclusively on the crime(s)
each committed. Rather, judges have the discretion to take into
consideration relevant factors, including those that affect the defendant’s family members and dependents. People have complicated pasts and extenuating circumstances, and “[e]ach of us is
more than the worst thing we’ve ever done.”292
Departures were built into the Sentencing Guidelines to account for the difficulty in accurately and fairly applying a standardized system to each individual case.293 The purposes of punishment in the federal sentencing system extend beyond merely
retribution for the offense committed.294 When one defendant
has dependents that rely upon them for care and support, another defendant who committed the same or similar offense (but
lacks dependents) is not similarly situated.295 Taking these dependents into consideration at sentencing does not lessen the
culpability of the defendant, but rather takes into account another factor worth consideration at sentencing: excessive hardship on vulnerable dependents.296
290. Id. at 462–63 (USSG § 5H1.6 cmt. 1(B)(i)).
291. 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
292. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 17–18 (2014).
293. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 7 (“[I]t is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision. . . . [T]he Commission, over
time, will be able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be permitted.”).
294. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D).
295. For an example of a court acknowledging the disparity argument but
finding the departure warranted nonetheless based on the implicit conclusion
that similarly situated defendants may be different due to their caregiving responsibilities, see United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98–99 (D.
Mass. 2002) (“If this departure means other offenders without dying spouses get
longer sentences, so be it; it is warranted by the Guidelines, by the facts, by our
common humanity.”).
296. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129–30 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“The rationale for a downward departure here is not that Johnson’s family circumstances decrease her culpability, but that we are reluctant to wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing. . . . ‘[The hardship of] those children being without a mother for an
extended period of time . . . was extraordinary grounds for a departure.’”);
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Carrying the burden of raising the next generation and repopulating the future workforce by having children is a pursuit
that the state routinely supports. While taxes are uniformly applied to adults with and without children, parents are offered tax
credits for having children,297 and government money funds public schools and playgrounds.298 This is one example of the state
acknowledging the difficult but important work of parenting,
and taking children’s needs into consideration when requiring
resources from or allocating resources to adults. Just as a defendant is greater than their crime, an adult is more than an
island without connections. Sentencing law in the United States
was never intended to evaluate someone in a vacuum when people lead complicated, intersectional lives that deeply affect others.
Defendants are not the only ones suffering from the effects
of incarceration and family separation. Cyphert argues that incarcerating parents and refusing to allow them to communicate
with and parent their children often leads to inevitable and unjust punishment for those children, who are blameless.299 Professor Sarah Abramowicz posits that if children are to be held
accountable as autonomous adults later in life, then the criminal
justice system must take them into consideration when sentencing parents, because incarcerating a parent can be so detrimental to a child’s development and wellbeing that they do not
form to become fully rational and legal adults.300 One scholar
Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp.at 98–99 (“These family responsibilities do not remotely
lessen the defendant’s culpability for the crimes he has committed. I depart only
in recognition of my unwillingness to wreak havoc on the life of the dying Ms.
LaCarubba [defendant’s wife] . . . .”).
297. Richard Auxier et al., The Tax Policy Center’s Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, What is the Child Tax Credit?, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing
-book/what-child-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/H7U7-9HEZ].
298. Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 25, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget
-and-tax/policy-basics-where-do-our-state-tax-dollars-go [https://perma.cc/6R2L
-F55M].
299. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 387 (“These blameless children, who have
done nothing wrong, nonetheless will ‘do the time’ with their parents, and will
likely experience a myriad of negative impacts. . . . [S]entencing judges have
largely accepted as a given, reluctantly or not, that these children are to be punished alongside their parents.”).
300. Abramowicz, supra note 25, at 798 (“If criminal law is to treat adults as
if they are autonomous, then it needs to take responsibility for any actions that
will render a child less so, such as the decision to incarcerate the parent of a
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went so far as to assert a constitutional right for children to
maintain a relationship with their incarcerated parents.301 As
much as possible, fit and interested parents should not be deprived of the opportunity to parent their children; anything less
serves undue hardship onto their children.
CONCLUSION
In the age of mass incarceration, and with the recent rapid
expansion of the number of incarcerated mothers, it has never
been more important to inspect the impact of parental incarceration on children. The repercussions of maternal incarceration,
which represents many caregivers in the United States, are pervasive and long-reaching. While United States federal sentencing law has long recognized extraordinary family circumstances
as worthy of consideration at sentencing, inconsistent implementation and insufficient clarification have resulted in disparate outcomes.
United States v. Huerta and United States v. Kon provide
judges with an additional tool within their arsenal of just sentencing practices: the presumption that it is reasonable for federal judges to grant downward departures for defendants who
are sole or primary caregivers of their dependents, and whom
are effectively irreplaceable. By spreading the use of and amplifying the precedent that creates the irreplaceability test, courts
can take family impact into account, and lessen the impactful
harms that parental incarceration has on all involved.

minor child.”); see also Warner, supra note 238, at 90 (“What the criminal justice
system and society forget is that these women are not merely ‘prisoners’—they
are mothers, and the future of their children is at stake.”).
301. Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to the Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 80
(2011) (“[This Article] puts forward the First Amendment freedom of association
and the due process liberty interest as the legal bases for children’s right to a
relationship with their convicted parents.”).

